Industry Reactions to U.S. Indicting 12 Russians for DNC Hack
20.7.18 securityweek BigBrothers
The U.S. last week indicted 12 Russian intelligence officers over their alleged role in a hacking operation targeting the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign.
The charges, part of special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into Russia’s attempt to interfere in the presidential election, were announced just days before President Donald Trump met his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.
Industry professionals have commented on the charges, their impact, the possible threat actors responsible for the operation, and how these types of attacks can be avoided.
And the feedback begins...
John Hultquist, Director of Intelligence Analysis, FireEye:
“While we had already been aware of much of the information covered in the indictment, there were several interesting insights into the organizations that lie behind the intrusion operators we track. In particular, the document indicates that more than one GRU unit was involved in efforts to undermine the elections. The first of these units, Unit 26165, resembles APT28, the operator who we originally suspected of carrying out the DNC incident. The second of these two units, Unit 74455, is implicated in incidents affecting election systems.
We have been actively tracking an actor we believe was tied to those incidents, and have found some connection between those incidents and others, such as efforts to target the 2017 French elections, and disruptive attacks on the 18 Olympics, as well as other incidents. Ultimately, though much of their activity remains opaque, we believe GRU organizations have been behind many of the most aggressive incidents in recent memory, including the economically devastating NotPetya attacks and attacks on Ukraine’s grid.”
John Gomez, CEO, Sensato:
“When you consider all that is going on and developing with the Russian hackers, it is important to note that we are very much in the embryonic stages of learning what, specifically, occurred. As more and more comes to light, I suspect we will come to appreciate the high level of sophistication that was employed to carry out the attacks. This attack was planned far in advance. It relied upon the coordination of various assets, including the development of fake personas, the recruitment of cybercriminals, monitoring news feeds, and establishing on-the-ground assets that could be plied for information and intelligence. The attackers timed the attacks to shake confidence and cause confusion.
Although the Russian hackers targeted our government, the real lesson here is that this level of sophistication is not isolated to the Russian hackers identified in the U.S Federal indictment. Rather, we are seeing that other criminal organizations, nation states, and even terrorists are employing the same level of sophistication in their operations. This development with Russia simply highlights what many of us have known all along: Attackers, regardless of motivation, have matured their tactics, techniques, and procedures. They’re innovating at a pace that far outstrips the defenses that most organizations have erected. Even basic attacks, such as phishing, are not the same approaches used a few years ago.
We may be appalled, shocked, and even outraged. Yet, maybe the biggest lesson is that despite all efforts, we failed at protecting one of our most treasured assets--the democratic process. What is more appalling is that many will continue to believe that the adversaries our IT organizations faced just a few years ago are the same adversaries our IT organizations face today. Hopefully, what has occurred with Russia will be a wake-up call, not only at the national level, but within our own organizations. If Russia can manipulate an electoral process, what could they and other, highly focused, well-funded cyber attackers do to our economy, our healthcare organizations, and other critical infrastructure systems like transportation or communications?”
Richard Ford, Chief Scientist, Forcepoint:
“We shouldn’t be distracted by talks of how they did this or why but instead – how will the international community respond to these types of asymmetric attacks that impact the very core of our democratic process? While an indictment is a nice gesture, it has little real consequences beyond drawing yet more attention to the issue.
Cybersecurity knows no borders, and so it is relatively easy for a nation state – or even an enthusiastic group of individuals – to launch attacks from the safety of their own country that can be impactful but carry very little personal risk. How we decide to treat these offensive cyber operations is one of the most pressing questions of our time, and those questions cannot be answered by governments alone. Attacks often involve third-party infrastructure, and vulnerabilities in this infrastructure have to be addressed by those in the commercial world.
It’s time for us as an international community to truly come together and determine not only what constitutes acceptable behavior online at the nation state level, but what checks and balances can be meaningfully put in place to those states that refuse to adhere to these agreed upon practices.”
Ross Rustici, Head of Intelligence Research, Cybereason:
"This further confirms the links already exposed from the indictments related to the social media influence campaigns. The concentrated effort of the Russia state to influence the election is undeniable. The most surprising thing about this is not only the relative ease of the intrusions but the wide spread campaign perpetrated by the GRU. This only serves to reinforce the dramatic changes that the internet has brought to influence operations around world. The ease with which intelligence agencies can have a direct influence in the information age is something that they could only dream of during the Cold War."
Kevin Mitnick, Chief Hacking Officer, KnowBe4:
“After reading the Russian indictment I was surprised to see that the Russians use the same exact methods we use to test our client's security controls. Our security engineers have never failed to get in when we can use social engineering (phishing, etc) during an assessment.
The biggest takeaway was that spearphishing is *still* the easiest way the bad guys get in. Why the DNC didn't use Multi-Factor Authentication is beyond me. I believe it is the lack of security awareness training that made it easy for the Russians to hack our election.”
Leo Taddeo, CISO, Cyxtera:
“The indictment teaches cyber security professionals several important lessons. Many legacy security solutions, even when used in combination, simply aren’t designed to mitigate the risks presented by today's adversaries.
A user-Centric, context-aware model is non-negotiable – Access controls that require only user name and password are effectively useless. Given the seemingly unstoppable effectiveness of spearphishing, enterprises must assume that one or more of their users has had their credentials compromised. An effective security solution must do more than just verify a user name and password. It must be be able to tell if the context of a remote connection is suspicious, such as if it originates from an unusual location or time of day, or from a device with no antivirus software installed. It should also be able to ask for additional authentication steps like one-time passwords (OTP), adjust user permissions on the fly and ultimately block access according to the level of risk. To accomplish this, organizations must adopt a user-centric context-aware model that is built on the principle of least privilege.
Authenticate first, connect second – The indictment specifically calls out that the conspirators conducted scanning on the network IP protocols. The fundamental reason for this vulnerability is that TCP/IP – which was originally designed to operate in an environment where the user community knew and trusted each other – is based on implicit trust, with a “connect first, authenticate second” approach. In today’s hyperconnected and highly adversarial threat landscape, this approach puts organizations at risk. Alternate access control technologies, such as Software-Defined Perimeter (SDP), are built on an “authenticate first, connect second” approach ensure that only authorized users can connect to network resources. This reduces the attack surface and significantly improves security. With Software Defined Perimeter, all resources are invisible to the dangerous reconnaissance techniques outlined in the indictment.
Manage the risks of third-party access – The indictment reveals the conspirators hacked into the DNC’s computers through their access to the DCCC network. Then, they installed and managed different types of malware to explore the DNC network and steal documents. This highlights the need for organizations to better manage the risks of third-party access. By using a solution that leverages the Software-Defined Perimeter (SDP) security framework, organizations can ensure that all endpoints attempting to access a given infrastructure are authenticated and authorized prior to accessing any resources on the network. This not only applies the principle of least privilege to the network, it also reduces the attack surface area by hiding network resources from unauthorized or unauthenticated users.”