I ran the POC in Google Chrome and as each character was entered in to the Input box, there was a list of auto-complete suggestions that popped-up. The amount of information that was in those lists was scary. Jeremiahís POC was not designed to capture the information in the auto-complete suggestion lists, it was only looking for values that got populated in to the textbox.
This is how it works:
User is asked to place his mouse pointer in one section of the page. By following the mouse movement we know exactly where the pointer this is located.
We create an input element of very small width (3px) and position it just a little above where the mouse pointer rests.
Now using the same method used by Jeremiah a character is entered in to the input box.
When the auto-complete suggestion list pops up, the first entry in the list is now right under the mouse pointer and is highlighted automatically.
Now the Input box is moved a little upwards and step 3 is repeated and this time the mouse pointer is over the second entry in the suggestion list and it is highlighted.
Step 3-6 are repeated till all values are read.
As you can see the only interaction from the user is hitting the enter key periodically. Chrome allows a maximum of 6 auto-complete suggestions per character and if the user plays the game for a couple of minutes the entire auto-complete suggestion data can be stolen by the attacker.
The POC works best in Google Chrome running on Windows. Because in this set-up an Input element of 3px width has an auto-complete suggestion list also of 3px width, it only looks like a thin white strip. And with a cleverly selected background this 3px strip is camouflaged and becomes practically invisible as done in the POC.
In Google Chrome running on Linux (thanks to Mario for verifying this) the width of the auto-complete box is not affected by the width of the input element, so even if the input element is of 3px the pop-up list is of its normal width. Itís the same story with Firefox even on Windows. If the list is of its normal width then it cannot be hidden from the user, CSS overlay techniques donít work, and the attack becomes very obvious for the victim to see.
Another factor that makes this attack possible is that when the pop-up list appears, the Ďmousemoveí event is triggered automatically and so the entry under the mouse pointer gets selected without the user having to move the mouse. I am not sure if this is a Google Chrome specific behavior or is common to all browsers, havenít tested that yet.
The POC is available here and there is also a video if you would like to see the attack in action.