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APT33: Researchers Expose Iranian Hacking Group Linked to Destructive Malware
21.9.2017 thehackernews APT

Security researchers have recently uncovered a cyber espionage group targeting aerospace, defence and energy organisations in the United States, Saudi Arabia and South Korea.
According to the latest research published Wednesday by US security firm FireEye, an Iranian hacking group that it calls Advanced Persistent Threat 33 (or APT33) has been targeting critical infrastructure, energy and military sectors since at least 2013 as part of a massive cyber-espionage operation to gather intelligence and steal trade secrets.
The security firm also says it has evidence that APT33 works on behalf of Iran's government.
FireEye researchers have spotted cyber attacks aimed by APT33 since at least May 2016 and found that the group has successfully targeted aviation sector—both military and commercial—as well as organisations in the energy sector with a link to petrochemical.
The APT33 victims include a U.S. firm in the aerospace sector, a Saudi Arabian business conglomerate with aviation holdings, and a South Korean company involved in oil refining and petrochemicals.
Most recently, in May 2017, APT33 targeted employees of a Saudi organisation and a South Korean business conglomerate using a malicious file that attempted to entice them with job vacancies for a Saudi Arabian petrochemical company.
"We believe the targeting of the Saudi organisation may have been an attempt to gain insight into regional rivals, while the targeting of South Korean companies may be due to South Korea’s recent partnerships with Iran’s petrochemical industry as well as South Korea’s relationships with Saudi petrochemical companies," the FireEye report reads.
APT33 targets organisations by sending spear phishing emails with malicious HTML links to infect targets' computers with malware. The malware used by the espionage group includes DROPSHOT (dropper), SHAPESHIFT (wiper) and TURNEDUP (custom backdoor, which is the final payload).
However, in previous research published by Kaspersky, DROPSHOT was tracked by its researchers as StoneDrill, which targeted petroleum company in Europe and believed to be an updated version of Shamoon 2 malware.
"Although we have only directly observed APT33 use DROPSHOT to deliver the TURNEDUP backdoor, we have identified multiple DROPSHOT samples in the wild that drop SHAPESHIFT," the report reads.
The SHAPESHIFT malware can wipe disks, erase volumes and delete files, depending on its configuration.
According to FireEye, APT 33 sent hundreds of spear phishing emails last year from several domains, which masqueraded as Saudi aviation companies and international organisations, including Boeing, Alsalam Aircraft Company and Northrop Grumman Aviation Arabia.
The security firm also believes APT 33 is linked to Nasr Institute, an Iranian government organisation that conducts cyber warfare operations.
In July, researchers at Trend Micro and Israeli firm ClearSky uncovered another Iranian espionage group, dubbed Rocket Kittens, that was also active since 2013 and targeted organisations and individuals, including diplomats and researchers, in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United States, Jordan and Germany.
However, FireEye report does not show any links between both the hacking group. For more technical details about the APT33 operations, you can head on to FireEye's official blog post.


Iranian cyber spies APT33 target aerospace and energy organizations
21.9.2017 securityaffairs  APT

The Iran-linked APT33 group has been targeting aerospace and energy organizations in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea.
According to security firm FireEye, a cyber espionage group linked to the Iranian Government, dubbed APT33, has been targeting aerospace and energy organizations in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea.

The APT33 group has been around since at least 2013, since mid-2016, the group targeted the aviation industry and energy companies with connections to petrochemical production.

“From mid-2016 through early 2017, APT33 compromised a U.S. organization in the aerospace sector and targeted a business conglomerate located in Saudi Arabia with aviation holdings.” reads a blog post published by FireEye.

“During the same time period, APT33 also targeted a South Korean company involved in oil refining and petrochemicals. More recently, in May 2017, APT33 appeared to target a Saudi organization and a South Korean business conglomerate using a malicious file that attempted to entice victims with job vacancies for a Saudi Arabian petrochemical company.”

According to the experts, the APT33 group is gathering information on Saudi Arabia’s military aviation capabilities to gain insight into rivals in the MiddleEast.

“We assess the targeting of multiple companies with aviation-related partnerships to Saudi Arabia indicates that APT33 may possibly be looking to gain insights on Saudi Arabia’s military aviation capabilities to enhance Iran’s domestic aviation capabilities or to support Iran’s military and strategic decision making vis a vis Saudi Arabia,” continues FireEye.

“We believe the targeting of the Saudi organization may have been an attempt to gain insight into regional rivals, while the targeting of South Korean companies may be due to South Korea’s recent partnerships with Iran’s petrochemical industry as well as South Korea’s relationships with Saudi petrochemical companies,”

The cyberspies leverage spear phishing emails sent to employees whose jobs related to the aviation industry.

APT33 phishing

The recruitment themed messages contained links to malicious HTML application (.hta) files. The .hta files contained job descriptions and links to legitimate job postings on popular employment websites that would be of interest for the victims.

The experts noticed APT33 used a built-in phishing module within the publicly available ALFA TEaM Shell (aka ALFASHELL) to send phishing messages to targeted individuals in 2016.

The attackers set up several domains that appeared as belonging to Saudi aviation firms and other companies that work with them, including Alsalam Aircraft Company, Boeing and Northrop Grumman Aviation Arabia.

The malware used by the APT33 group includes a dropper dubbed DROPSHOT that has been linked to the wiper malware SHAPESHIFT, tracked by Kaspersky as StoneDrill, used in targeted attacks against organizations in Saudi Arabia. The arsenal of the group also includes a backdoor called TURNEDUP.

Kaspersky experts linked the StoneDrill malware to the Shamoon 2 and Charming Kitten (aka Newscaster and NewsBeef), a threat actor believed to be operating out of Iran.

The researchers identified an actor using the handle “xman_1365_x” that has been involved in the development and use of the TURNEDUP backdoor.

“Xman_1365_x was also a community manager in the Barnamenevis Iranian programming and software engineering forum, and registered accounts in the well-known Iranian Shabgard and Ashiyane forums, though we did not find evidence to suggest that this actor was ever a formal member of the Shabgard or Ashiyane hacktivist groups.” continues FireEye.

FireEye cited open source reporting links the “xman_1365_x” actor to the “Nasr Institute,” which is the equivalent to Iran’s “cyber army” and directly controlled by the Iranian government.


Dragonfly 2.0: Hacking Group Infiltrated European and US Power Facilities
7.9.2017 thehackernews APT

The notorious hacking group that has been in operation since at least 2011 has re-emerged and is still interested in targeting the United States and European companies in the energy sector.
Yes, I am talking about the 'Dragonfly,' a well-resourced, Eastern European hacking group responsible for sophisticated cyber-espionage campaigns against the critical infrastructure of energy companies in different countries in past years.
In 2014, we reported about the Dragonfly groups ability to mount sabotage operations against their targets—mainly petroleum pipeline operators, electricity generation firms and other Industrial Control Systems (ICS) equipment providers for the energy sector.
Researchers from cyber security firm Symantec who discovered the previous campaign is now warning of a new campaign, which they dubbed Dragonfly 2.0, saying "the group now potentially has the ability to sabotage or gain control of these systems should it decide to do so" and has already gained unprecedented access to operational systems of Western energy firms.
Here are the major highlights of the group activities outlined in the new report from Symantec:
The hacking group has been active since late 2015 and reportedly using same tactics and tools that were used in earlier campaigns.
The major objective of the Dragonfly 2.0 group is to collect intelligence and gain access to the networks of the targeted organization, eventually making the group capable of mounting sabotage operations when required.
Dragonfly 2.0 majorly targeting the critical energy sectors in the U.S., Turkey, and Switzerland.
Like previous Dragonfly campaigns, the hackers are using malicious email (containing very specific content related to the energy sector) attachments, watering hole attacks, and Trojanized software as an initial attack vector to gain access to a victim's network.
The group is using a toolkit called Phishery (available on GitHub) to perform email-based attacks that host template injection attack to steal victim's credentials.
Malware campaign involves multiple remote access Trojans masquerading as Flash updates called, Backdoor.Goodor, Backdoor.Dorshel and Trojan.Karagany.B, allowing attackers to provide remote access to the victim's machine.
However, Symantec researchers did not find any evidence of the Dragonfly 2.0 group using any zero day vulnerabilities. Instead, the hacking group strategically uses publically available administration tools like PowerShell, PsExec, and Bitsadmin, making attribution more difficult.
"The Dragonfly 2.0 campaigns show how the attackers may be entering into a new phase, with recent campaigns potentially providing them with access to operational systems, access that could be used for more disruptive purposes in future," Symantec believes.
Cyber attacks on energy grids are not a new thing. Energy companies in Ukraine targeted by hackers on two different occasions in late 2015 and late 2016, actually caused the power outage across several regions in Ukraine, causing a blackout for tens of thousands of citizens around midnight.
Moreover, Nuclear facilities in the United States, including Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, were targeted by a well-known Russian group back in July this year, but luckily there's no proof if the hackers were able to gain access to the operational systems or not.


Dragonfly 2.0: the sophisticated attack group is back with destructive purposes
7.9.2017 securityaffairs APT

While the first Dragonfly campaigns appear to have been a more reconnaissance phase, the Dragonfly 2.0 campaign seems to have destructive purposes.
Symantec has spotted a new wave of cyber attacks against firms in the energy sector powered by the notorious Dragonfly group.

The Dragonfly group, also known as Energetic Bear, has been active since at least 2011 when it targeted defense and aviation companies in the US and Canada. Only in a second phase Dragonfly has focused its effort on US and European energy firms in early 2013.

In 2014, security experts at Symantec uncovered a new campaign targeting organizations located in the US, Italy, France, Spain, Germany, Turkey, and Poland.

Dragonfly gang conducted a cyber espionage campaign against energy grid operators, major electricity generation firms, petroleum pipeline operators, and energy industry industrial equipment providers.

According to the JAR report published by the US Department of Homeland Security, Dragonfly was Russian APT actor linked to the Government.

The infamous group remained under the radar since December 2015, but now the researchers pointed out Dragonfly targeted energy companies in Europe and the US.

This time the attackers aimed to control or even sabotage operational systems at energy facilities.

“The Dragonfly group appears to be interested in both learning how energy facilities operate and also gaining access to operational systems themselves, to the extent that the group now potentially has the ability to sabotage or gain control of these systems should it decide to do so,” reads the report published by Symantec.

According to Symantec, the Dragonfly 2.0 campaign begun in late 2015, threat actors used same TTPs of previous campaigns.

“The energy sector in Europe and North America is being targeted by a new wave of cyber attacks that could provide attackers with the means to severely disrupt affected operations. The group behind these attacks is known as Dragonfly.” reads the analysis published by Symantec.”The group has been in operation since at least 2011 but has re-emerged over the past two years from a quiet period following exposure by Symantec and a number of other researchers in 2014. This “Dragonfly 2.0” campaign, which appears to have begun in late 2015, shares tactics and tools used in earlier campaigns by the group.”

Researchers discovered many similarities between earlier Dragonfly campaigns and recent attacks.

The energy sector has become a privileged target for state-sponsored hackers over the last two years, let’s think for example of power outages caused in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016 that were attributed to Russian APT groups.

Symantec believes the group is very advanced, it operates to make hard the attribution of the attacks. Below some of the tactics employed by the hackers:

The attackers used more generally available malware and “living off the land” tools, such as administration tools like PowerShell, PsExec, and Bitsadmin, which may be part of a strategy to make attribution more difficult. The Phishery toolkit became available on Github in 2016, and a tool used by the group—Screenutil—also appears to use some code from CodeProject.
The attackers also did not use any zero days. As with the group’s use of publicly available tools, this could be an attempt to deliberately thwart attribution, or it could indicate a lack of resources.
Some code strings in the malware were in Russian. However, some were also in French, which indicates that one of these languages may be a false flag.
The experts noticed most attacker activity in organizations in the US, Turkey, and Switzerland.

dragonfly 2

Dragonfly 2.0 continues to use a wide range of attack vectors, from spear phishing messages to watering holes.
In the first attacks spotted by Symantec in December 2015, attackers used emails disguised as an invitation to a New Year’s Eve party.

Other campaigns conducted during 2016 and 2017 used spear phishing messages specifically designed with content related to the energy sector.

Phishing emails spotted by Symantec were created with the Phishery toolkit in the attempt to steal victims’ credentials via a template injection attack.

The attackers also used watering hole attacks to harvest network credentials, they targeted websites likely to be visited by personnel involved in the energy sector.

Symantec reported that at least in one case, the watering hole attack was used to deliver the Goodor backdoor via PowerShell 11 days later.

“Symantec also has evidence to suggest that files masquerading as Flash updates may be used to install malicious backdoors onto target networks—perhaps by using social engineering to convince a victim they needed to download an update for their Flash player. Shortly after visiting specific URLs, a file named “install_flash_player.exe” was seen on victim computers, followed shortly by the Trojan.Karagany.B backdoor.” continues the analysis.

While the first Dragonfly campaigns appear to have been a more reconnaissance phase, the Dragonfly 2.0 campaign seems to have destructive purposes.


Introducing WhiteBear
6.9.2017 Kaspersky APT

As a part of our Kaspersky APT Intelligence Reporting subscription, customers received an update in mid-February 2017 on some interesting APT activity that we called WhiteBear. Much of the contents of that report are reproduced here. WhiteBear is a parallel project or second stage of the Skipper Turla cluster of activity documented in another private intelligence report “Skipper Turla – the White Atlas framework” from mid-2016. Like previous Turla activity, WhiteBear leverages compromised websites and hijacked satellite connections for command and control (C2) infrastructure. As a matter of fact, WhiteBear infrastructure has overlap with other Turla campaigns, like those deploying Kopiluwak, as documented in “KopiLuwak – A New JavaScript Payload from Turla” in December 2016. WhiteBear infected systems maintained a dropper (which was typically signed) as well as a complex malicious platform which was always preceded by WhiteAtlas module deployment attempts. However, despite the similarities to previous Turla campaigns, we believe that WhiteBear is a distinct project with a separate focus. We note that this observation of delineated target focus, tooling, and project context is an interesting one that also can be repeated across broadly labeled Turla and Sofacy activity.

From February to September 2016, WhiteBear activity was narrowly focused on embassies and consular operations around the world. All of these early WhiteBear targets were related to embassies and diplomatic/foreign affair organizations. Continued WhiteBear activity later shifted to include defense-related organizations into June 2017. When compared to WhiteAtlas infections, WhiteBear deployments are relatively rare and represent a departure from the broader Skipper Turla target set. Additionally, a comparison of the WhiteAtlas framework to WhiteBear components indicates that the malware is the product of separate development efforts. WhiteBear infections appear to be preceded by a condensed spearphishing dropper, lack Firefox extension installer payloads, and contain several new components signed with a new code signing digital certificate, unlike WhiteAtlas incidents and modules.

The exact delivery vector for WhiteBear components is unknown to us, although we have very strong suspicion the group spearphished targets with malicious pdf files. The decoy pdf document above was likely stolen from a target or partner. And, although WhiteBear components have been consistently identified on a subset of systems previously targeted with the WhiteAtlas framework, and maintain components within the same filepaths and can maintain identical filenames, we were unable to firmly tie delivery to any specific WhiteAtlas component. WhiteBear focused on various embassies and diplomatic entities around the world in early 2016 – tellingly, attempts were made to drop and display decoy pdf’s with full diplomatic headers and content alongside executable droppers on target systems.

Technical Details

The WhiteBear platform implements an elaborate set of messaging and injection components to support full presence on victim hosts. A diagram helps to visualize the reach of injected components on the system.

WhiteBear Binary loader

Sample MD5: b099b82acb860d9a9a571515024b35f0
Type PE EXE
Compilation timestamp 2002.02.05 17:36:10 (GMT)
Linker version 10.0 (MSVC 2010)
Signature “Solid Loop Ldt” UTCTime 15/10/2015 00:00:00 GMT – UTCTime 14/10/2016 23:59:59 GMT

The WhiteBear binary loader maintains several features including two injection methods for its (oddly named) “KernelInjector” subsystem, also named by its developer
– Standart
– WindowInject (includes an unusual technique for remotely placing code into memory for subsequent thread execution)

The loader also maintains two methods for privilege and DEP process protection handling:
– GETSID_METHOD_1
– GETSID_METHOD_2

The binary contains two resources:
– BINARY 201
– File size: 128 bytes
– Contains the string, “explorer.exe”
– BINARY 202
– File size: 403456 bytes
– File Type: PE file (this is the actual payload and is not encrypted)
– This PE file resource stores the “main orchestrator” .dll file

Loader runtime flow

The loader creates the mutex “{531511FA-190D-5D85-8A4A-279F2F592CC7}”, and waits up to two minutes if it is already present while logging the message “IsLoaderAlreadyWork +”. The loader creates the mutex “{531511FA-190D-5D85-8A4A-279F2F592CC7}”, and waits up to two minutes. If it is already present while logging the message “IsLoaderAlreadyWork +”, it extracts the resource BINARY 201. This resource contains a wide string name of processes to inject into (i.e. “explorer.exe”).

The loader makes a pipe named: \\.\pipe\Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-%03x%01x-%01x

Where the “%x” parameter is replaced with the values 0xFFFFFFFF 0xEEEEEEEE 0xDDDDDDDD, or if it has successfully obtained the user’s SID:
\\.\pipe\Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-%02x%02x-%01x
With “%x” parameters replaced with numbers calculated from the current date and a munged user SID.

The pipe is used to communicate with the target process and the transport module; the running code also reads its own image body and writes it to the pipe. The loader then obtains the payload body from resource BINARY 202. It finds the running process that matches the target name, copies the buffer containing the payload into the process, then starts its copy in the target process.

There are some interesting, juvenile, and non-native English-speaker debug messages compiled into the code:
– i cunt waiting anymore #%d
– lights aint turnt off with #%d
– Not find process
– CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_NO_CONNECT_TO_GAYZER
– CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_TAKE_LAST_CONNECTION
– CMessageProcessingSystem::Send_TAKE_FIN

WhiteBear Main module/orchestrator

Sample MD5: 06bd89448a10aa5c2f4ca46b4709a879
Type, size: PE DLL, 394 kb
Compilation timestamp: 2002.02.05 17:31:28 (GMT)
Linker version: 10.0 (MSVC 2010)
Unsigned Code

The main module has no exports, only a DllMain entry which spawns one thread and returns. The main module maintains multiple BINARY resources that include executable, configurations, and encryption data:

101 – RSA private (!) key
102 – RSA public key
103 – empty
104 – 16 encrypted bytes
105 – location (“%HOMEPATH%\ntuser.dat.LOG3”)
106 – process names (e.g. “iexplore.exe, firefox.exe, chrome.exe, outlook.exe, safari.exe, opera.exe”) to inject into
107 – Transport module for interaction with C&C
108 – C2 configuration
109 – Registry location (“\HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Screen Saver”)
110 – no information
111 – 8 zero bytes

Values 104 – 111 are encrypted with the RSA private key (resource 101) and compressed with bzip2.4. The RSA key is stored with header stripped in a format similar to Microsoft’s PVK; the RSA PRIVATE KEY header is appended by the loader before reading the keys into the encryption code. Resource 109 points to a registry location called “external storage”, built-in resources are called “PE Storage”.

In addition to storing code, crypto resources, and configuration data in PE resources, WhiteBear copies much of this data to the victim host’s registry. Registry storage is located in the following keys. Subkeys and stored values listed below:
[HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ScreenSaver] [HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ScreenSaver]

Registry subkeys:
{629336E3-58D6-633B-5182-576588CF702A} Contains the RSA private key used to encrypt/decrypt other resources / resource 101
{3CDC155D-398A-646E-1021-23047D9B4366} Resource 105 – current file location
{81A03BF8-60AA-4A56-253C-449121D61CAF} Resource 106 – process names
{31AC34A1-2DE2-36AC-1F6E-86F43772841F} Contains the internet C&C transport module / resource 107
{8E9810C5-3014-4678-27EE-3B7A7AC346AF} Resource 108 – C&C config
{28E74BDA-4327-31B0-17B9-56A66A818C1D} Resource 110 “plugins”
{4A3130BD-2608-730F-31A7-86D16CE66100} Resource 111
{119D263D-68FC-1942-3CA3-46B23FA652A0} Unique Guid (“ObjectID”)
{1DC12691-2B24-2265-435D-735D3B118A70} “Task Queue”
{6CEE6FE1-10A2-4C33-7E7F-855A51733C77} “Result Queue”
{56594FEA-5774-746D-4496-6361266C40D0} unknown
{831511FA-190D-5D85-8A4A-279F2F592CC7} unknown

Finally, if the main WhiteBear module fails to use registry storage, it uses “FS Storage” in file %TEMP%\KB943729.log. The module reads all of its data and binary components from one of the storages and then verifies the integrity of data (RSA+bzip2 compression+signature).

The module maintains functionality which is divided into a set of subsystems that are loosely named by the developers:
• result queue
• task queue
• message processing system
• autorun manager
• execution subsystem
• inject manager
• PEStorage
• local transport manager/internal transport channel

It creates the following temporary files:
%TEMP%\CVRG72B5.tmp.cvr
%TEMP%\CVRG1A6B.tmp.cvr
%TEMP%\CVRG38D9.tmp.cvr

%TEMP%\~DF1E05.tmp contains the updated body of the loader during an update.

Every day (as specified by local time) the main module restarts the transport subsystem which includes:
• message processing
• named pipe transport (“NPTransport”)

If the registry/file storage is empty, the module performs a ‘migration’ of hardcoded modules and settings to the storage location. This data is encrypted with a new RSA key (which is also stored in the registry).

The data in the registry is prepended with a 0xC byte header. The maximum size of each registry item is 921,600 bytes; if the maximum size is exceeded, it is split into several items. The format of the header is shown below:
[4:service DWORD][4:chunk index][4:chunk size including header]

Every time the orchestrator module is loaded it validates that the storage area contains the appropriate data and that all of the components can be decrypted and validated. If these checks fail the module reinstalls a configuration from the resource “REINSTALL”.

Pipe Transport

The module generates the pipe name (with the same prefix as the loader); waits for incoming connections; receives data and pushes it to the ‘message processing system’. The module generates the pipe name (with the same prefix as the loader); waits for incoming connections; receives data and pushes it to the ‘message processing system’. Every packet is expected to be at least 6 bytes and contain the following header: [4:ID][2:command]

List of commands:
1 : new task
2 : update the loader + orchestrator file
4 : send task result
5 : send settings
6 : write results to registry/file storage
7 : enable / disable c2 transport / update status
8 : uninstall
9 : nop
10 : “CMessageProcessingSystem::Receive_NO_CONNECT_TO_GAYZER”; write results to registry
11: write the last connection data ‘{56594FEA-5774-746D-4496-6361266C40D0}’ aka “last connection” storage value
12: “give cache” – write cached commands from the C&C
13: “take cache” – append C&C commands to the cache

Depending on the command, the module returns the results from previously run tasks, the configuration of the module, or a confirmation message.

An example of these tasks is shown below:
• write a file and execute it with CreateProcess() capturing all of the standard output
• update C&C configuration, plugin storage, etc
• update autoruns
• write arbitrary files to the filesystem (“File Upload”)
• read arbitrary files from the filesystem (“File Download”)
• update itself
• uninstall
• push task results to C2 servers

The “LocalTransport manager” handles named pipe communication and identifies if the packet received is designated to the current instance or to someone else (down the route). In the latter scenario the LocalTansport manager re-encrypts the packet, serializes it (again), and pushes the packet via a named pipe on the local network to another hop, (NullSessionPipes). This effectively makes each infected node a packet router.

The Autorun manager subsystem is responsible for tracking the way that the malicious module starts in the system and it maintains several different methods for starting automatically (shown below):
LinkAutorun The subsystem searches for a LNK file in the target directory, changes the path to “cmd.exe” and the description to ‘ /q /c start “” “%s” && start “” “%s” ‘
TaskScheduler20Autorun The subsystem creates the ITaskService (works only on Windows Vista+) and uses the ITaskService interface to create a new task with a logon trigger
StartupAutorun The subsystem creates a LNK file in %STARTUP%
ScreenSaverAutorun The subsystem installs as a current screensaver with a hidden window
HiddenTaskAutorun The subsystem creates the task ITaskScheduler (works only on pre-Vista NT). The task trigger start date is set to the creation date of the Windows directory
ShellAutorun Winlogon registry [HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon] Shell=”explorer.exe, …”

File Uninstallation is done in a discreet manner. The file is filled with zeroes, then renamed to a temporary filename before being deleted

WhiteBear Transport library (aka “Internet Relations”, “Pipe Relations”)

Sample MD5: 19ce5c912768958aa3ee7bc19b2b032c
Type: PE DLL
Linker timestamp: 2002.02.05 17:58:22 (GMT)
Linker version: 10.0
Signature “Solid Loop Ldt” UTCTime 15/10/2015 00:00:00 GMT – UTCTime 14/10/2016 23:59:59 GMT

This transport library does not appear on disk in its PE format. It is maintained as encrypted resource 107 in the orchestrator module, then decrypted and loaded by the orchestrator directly into the memory of the target process. This C2 interaction module is independent, once started, it interacts with the orchestrator using its local named pipe.

To communicate with its C2 server, the transport library uses the system user agent or default “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0)”.

Before attempting a connection with its configured C2 server, the module checks if the victim system is connected to Internet by sending HTTP 1.1 GET / requests to the following servers (this process stops after the first successful connection):
• update.microsoft.com
• microsoft.com
• windowsupdate.microsoft.com
• yahoo.com
• google.com

If there is no Internet connection available, the module changes state to, “CANNOT_WORK” and notifies the peer by sending command “7” over the local pipe.

The C2 configuration is obtained from the main module with the command “5”. This checks whether the module complies with the schedule specified in the C2 settings (which includes inactivity time and the interval between connections). The C2 interaction stages have interesting function names and an odd misspelling, indicating that the developer may not be a native English speaker (or may have learned the English language in a British setting):
“InternetRelations::GetInetConnectToGazer”
“InternetRelations::ReceiveMessageFromCentre”
“InternetRelations::SendMessageToCentre”
“PipeRelations::CommunicationTpansportPipe”

The module writes the encrypted log to %TEMP%\CVRG38D9.tmp.cvr The module sends a HTTP 1.0 GET request through a randomly generated path to the C2 server. The server’s reply is expected to have its MD5 checksum appended to the packet. If C2 interaction fails, the module sends the command “10” (“NO_CONNECT_TO_GAYZER”) to the orchestrator.

Unusual WhiteBear Encryption

The encryption implemented in the WhiteBear orchestrator is particularly interesting. We note that the resource section is encrypted/decrypted and packed/decompressed with RSA+3DES+BZIP2. This implementation is unique and includes the format of the private key as stored in the resource section. 3DES is present in Sofacy and Duqu2 components, however they are missing in this Microsoft-centric RSA encryption technique. The private key format used in this schema and RSA crypto combination with 3DES is (currently) unique to this threat actor.

The private key itself is stored as a raw binary blob, in a format similar to the one Microsoft code uses in PVK format. This format is not officially documented, but its structures and handling are coded into OpenSSL. This private key value is stored in the orchestrator resources without valid headers. The orchestrator code prepends valid headers and passes the results to OpenSSL functions that parse the blob.

Digital Code-Signing Certificate – Fictional Corporation or Assumed Identity?

Most WhiteBear samples are signed with a valid code signing certificate issued for “Solid Loop Ltd”, a once-registered British organization. Solid Loop is likely a phony front organization or a defunct organization and actors assumed its identity to abuse the name and trust, in order to attain deceptive code-signing digital certificates.

WhiteBear Command and Control

The WhiteBear C2 servers are consistent with long standing Turla infrastructure management practices, so the backdoors callback to a mix of compromised servers and hijacked destination satellite IP hosts. For example, direct, hardcoded Turla satellite IP C2 addresses are shown below:

C2 IP Address Geolocation IP Space Owner
169.255.137[.]203 South Sudan IPTEC, VSAT
217.171.86[.]137 Congo Global Broadband Solution, Kinshasa VSAT
66.178.107[.]140 Unknown – Likely Africa SES/New Skies Satellites

Targeting and Victims

WhiteBear targets over the course of a couple years are related to government foreign affairs, international organizations, and later, defense organizations. The geolocation of the incidents are below:

Europe
South Asia
Central Asia
East Asia
South America
Conclusions

WhiteBear activity reliant on this toolset seems to have diminished in June 2017. But Turla efforts continue to be run as multiple subgroups and campaigns. This one started targeting diplomatic entities and later included defense related organizations. Infrastructure overlap with other Turla campaigns, code artifacts, and targeting are consistent with past Turla efforts. With this subset of 2016-2017 WhiteBear activity, Turla continues to be one of the most prolific, longstanding, and advanced APT we have researched, and continues to be the subject of much of our research. Links to publicly reported research are below.

Reference Set

Full IOC and powerful YARA rules delivered with private report subscription

Md5
b099b82acb860d9a9a571515024b35f0
19ce5c912768958aa3ee7bc19b2b032c
06bd89448a10aa5c2f4ca46b4709a879

IP
169.255.137[.]203
217.171.86[.]137
66.178.107[.]140

Domain(s)
soligro[.]com – interesting because the domain is used in another Turla operation (KopiLuwak), and is the C2 server for the WhiteBear transport library
mydreamhoroscope[.]com

Example log upon successful injection

|01:58:10:216|.[0208|WinMain ]..
|01:58:14:982|.[0209|WinMain ].******************************************************************************************
|01:58:15:826|.[0212|WinMain ].DATE: 01.01.2017
|01:58:21:716|.[0215|WinMain ].PID=2344.TID=1433.Heaps=3
|01:58:22:701|.[0238|WinMain ].CreateMutex = {521555FA-170C-4AA7-8B2D-159C2F491AA4}
|01:58:25:513|.[0286|GetCurrentUserSID ]._GETSID_METHOD_1_
|01:58:26:388|.[0425|GetUserSidByName ].22 15 1284404594 111
|01:58:27:404|.[0463|GetUserSidByName ].S-1-5-31-4261848827-3118844265-2233733001-1000
|01:58:28:263|.[0471|GetUserSidByName ].
|01:58:29:060|.[0165|GeneratePipeName ].\\.\pipe\Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-5623-b
|01:58:29:763|.[0275|WinMain ].PipeName = \\.\pipe\Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener-5623-b
|01:58:30:701|.[0277|WinMain ].Checking for existence…
|01:58:31:419|.[0308|WinMain ].— Pipe is not installed yet
|01:58:32:044|.[0286|GetCurrentUserSID ]._GETSID_METHOD_1_
|01:58:32:841|.[0425|GetUserSidByName ].22 15 1284404594 111
|01:58:33:701|.[0463|GetUserSidByName ].S-1-5-31-4261848827-3118844265-2233733001-1000
|01:58:34:419|.[0471|GetUserSidByName ].
|01:58:35:201|.[0318|WinMain ].Loading…
|01:58:35:763|.[0026|KernelInjector::KernelInjector ].Address of marker: 0x0025F96C and cProcName: 0x0025F860
|01:58:36:513|.[0031|KernelInjector::KernelInjector ].Value of marker = 0xFFFFFEF4
|01:58:37:279|.[0088|KernelInjector::SetMethod ].m_bAntiDEPMethod = 1
|01:58:38:419|.[0564|QueryProcessesInformation ].OK
|01:58:41:169|.[0286|GetCurrentUserSID ]._GETSID_METHOD_1_
|01:58:42:076|.[0425|GetUserSidByName ].22 15 1284404594 111
|01:58:42:748|.[0463|GetUserSidByName ].S-1-5-31-4261848827-3118844265-2233733001-1000
|01:58:43:169|.[0471|GetUserSidByName ].
|01:58:43:701|.[0309|FindProcesses ].dwPID[0] = 1260
|01:58:44:560|.[0345|WinMain ].try to load dll to process (pid=1260))
|01:58:45:013|.[0088|KernelInjector::SetMethod ].m_bAntiDEPMethod = 1
|01:58:45:873|.[0094|KernelInjector::LoadDllToProcess ].MethodToUse = 1
|01:58:46:544|.[0171|KernelInjector::GetProcHandle ].pid = 1260
|01:58:47:279|.[0314|KernelInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer ].Trying to allocate space at address 0x20020000
|01:58:48:404|.[0332|KernelInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer ].IMAGEBASE = 0x20020000.ENTRYPOINT = 0x2002168B
|01:58:48:763|.[0342|KernelInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer ].ANTIDEP INJECT
|01:58:49:419|.[0345|KernelInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer ].Writing memory to target process….
|01:58:49:935|.[0353|KernelInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer ].Calling to entry point….
|01:58:51:185|.[0598|KernelInjector::CallEntryPoint ].CODE = 0x01FA0000, ENTRY = 0x2002168B, CURR = 0x77A465A5, TID = 1132
|01:58:55:544|.[0786|KernelInjector::CallEntryPoint ]._FINISH_ = 1
|01:58:56:654|.[0372|KernelInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer ].CTRLPROC = 0
|01:58:57:607|.[0375|KernelInjector::CopyDllFromBuffer ].+ INJECTED +
|01:58:58:419|.[0351|WinMain ].+++ Load in 1260


DragonOK APT is adopting new tactics, techniques and procedures
2.9.2017 securityaffairs APT

Researchers at Palo Alto Networks recently observed the DragonOK APT group adopting new tactics, techniques and procedures.
China-linked cyber espionage group DragonOK is back, security experts from Palo Alto Networks have uncovered a new campaign leveraging the KHRAT remote access Trojan (RAT).

The DragonOk group (also known as NetTraveler (TravNet), PlugX, Saker, Netbot, DarkStRat, and ZeroT i) was first spotted September 2014 by security researchers at FireEye.

At the time, FireEye discovered two hacking campaigns conducted by distinct groups operating in separate regions of China that seem to work in parallel.

The first team of hackers named Moafee, targeted military and government organizations which were in some way involved in South China sea dispute. The attackers hit different organizations as explained by the researchers at FireEye and appear to operate from the Guangdong Province. The group hit entities working in the defense industry in the United States.

A second team, dubbed DragonOK, conducted corporate espionage operations on high-tech and manufacturing companies in Japan and Taiwan.

Early this year, DragonOK targeted Japanese organizations in several industries, including manufacturing, technology, energy, higher education, and semiconductor.

The recent campaign featuring the KHRAT RAT targets victims located in Cambodia.

“Unit 42 recently observed activity involving the Remote Access Trojan KHRAT used by threat actors to target the citizens of Cambodia.” reads the blog post published by PaloAlto networks.

“So called because the Command and Control (C2) infrastructure from previous variants of the malware was located in Cambodia, as discussed by Roland Dela Paz at Forecpoint here, KHRAT is a Trojan that registers victims using their infected machine’s username, system language and local IP address. KHRAT provides the threat actors typical RAT features and access to the victim system, including keylogging, screenshot capabilities, remote shell access and so on.”

DragonOK espionage campaign

The KHRAT RAT provides attackers with the typical set of RAT features, including remote access to the victim system, keylogging, and remote shell access.

Researchers from PaloAlto Networks noticed the threat actor has updated the spear phishing techniques and themes used in its campaign.

The hackers are using multiple methods to download and execute additional payloads using built-in Windows applications, they also started mimicking Dropbox.

Below Key findings provided by PaloAlto networks:

Updated spear phishing techniques and themes;
Multiple techniques to download and execute additional payloads using built-in Windows applications;
Expanded infrastructure mimicking the name of the well-known cloud-based file hosting service, Dropbox;
Compromised Cambodian government servers.
The experts observed an increase in the usage of this specific RAT over the past couple of months, the attacks against Cambodian entities were discovered in June.

Researchers observed the DragonOK group using weaponized files referencing in the title the “MIWRMP” (Mekong Integrated Water Resources Management Project), a multi-million dollar project regarding water resources and fisheries management in North Eastern Cambodia.

“The weaponized document, with the filename “Mission Announcement Letter for MIWRMP phase 3 implementation support mission, June 26-30, 2017(update).doc”, was shown in AutoFocus as contacting a Russian IP address 194.87.94[.]61 over port 80 in the form of a HTTP GET request to update.upload-dropbox[.]com – a site that could (erroneously) be thought of as belonging to the well-known cloud-based file hosting service, Dropbox, and as such is intended to trick victims and network defenders into thinking, at least at first glance, the C2 traffic is legitimate.” states the analysis.

The document trick victims into enabling macros to run malicious operations, including creating new scheduled tasks and calling functions to run JavaScript code.

PaloAlto experts observed hackers using the domain name update.upload-dropbox[.]com that has been hosted on a compromised Cambodian government’s website.

The sample hosted on the compromised government servers would launch the legitimate regsvr32.exe program to bypass included Windows protections.

“Index.ico would create three scheduled tasks with the more subtly named “Windows Scheduled Maintenance1” (Maintenance2 and Maintenance3), although three services with incremented numbers in their names is also a little suspicious, and use regsvr32.exe to download and execute three other .ico files – reg.ico, reg_salt.ico and reg_bak.ico – the purposes of which are currently unknown.” continues the analysis. “It’s worth noting each service has different running frequencies – every 4 minutes, 20 minutes and 10 minutes, respectively, which could indicate a dependency on reg.ico, as it is more aggressively sought after, or that is a more critical component to have running.”

The researchers also noticed that threat actor used a JavaScript code that allows it to monitor who is visiting their site. The code would gather data such as user-agent, domain, cookie, referrer and Flash version, and appears almost identical to that found on a blog hosted on the Chinese Software Developer Network (CSDN) website.

The malware researchers conclude that the DragonOK APT has updated both the malware and their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) in the last months probably, because it was planning to intensify its activity.months probably, because it was planning to intensify its activity.

“The threat actors behind KHRAT have evolved the malware and their TTPs over the course of this year, in an attempt to produce more successful attacks, which in this case included targets within Cambodia.” concluded PaloAlto.

“This most recent campaign highlights social engineering techniques being used with reference and great detail given to nationwide activities, likely to be forefront of peoples’ minds; as well as the new use of multiple techniques in Windows to download and execute malicious payloads using built-in applications to remain inconspicuous which is a change since earlier variants,”


Chinese APT17 group leverages fake Game of Thrones leaks as lures
28.8.2017 securityaffairs APT

Researchers at Proofpoint spotted a cyber espionage campaign leveraging recent Game of Thrones episode leaks and attribute it to Chinese APT17 group.
Security researchers at Proofpoint have uncovered a cyber espionage campaign leveraging recent Game of Thrones episode leaks to trick victims into opening malicious documents sent via email.

Experts have observed during the past week, the threat actor sending emails to victims with the subject of “Wanna see the Game of Thrones in advance?”

The malicious messages use weaponized documents booby-trapped with an embedded LNK file that runs a Powershell script to installs the 9002 remote access trojan and gain full access to the victim’s machine.

“Proofpoint recently observed a targeted email campaign attempting a spearphishing attack using a Game of Thrones lure. The malicious attachment, which offered salacious spoilers and video clips, attempted to install a “9002” remote access Trojan (RAT) historically used by state-sponsored actors.” reads the analysis published by Proofpoint.

The 9002 RAT was well known by experts in the IT security community, below a list of operations that involved it:

Operation Aurora, an attack on companies such as Google, widely attributed to the Chinese government.
Operation Ephemeral Hydra, a strategic website compromise utilizing an Internet Explorer zero-day [3], which FireEye attributed to an APT actor without a country attribution
Attacks on Asian countries described by Palo Alto.
9002 RAt APT17 phishing

The experts attributed the attack to a cyber-espionage group tracked as Deputy Dog, Group 27, or APT17, that according to the reports of many security firms, is composed of Chinese hackers operating out of China.

Researchers found many similarities with a campaign conducted by the APT group far back as April 2014. Several ZIP compressed files containing a similar LNK downloader were uploaded to a malicious file scanning service.

“Based on several shared identifiers, it is possible that the recent campaigns were conducted by the same actor that conducted the campaigns in early- to mid-2014. The malicious LNK files in both campaigns (2014 vs. 2017) have the same Volume Serial Number of 0xCC9CE694. Furthermore, the LNK filename used in one of the campaigns this year is almost identical to the campaigns in 2014: Party00[1-35].jpg.lnk (2017) vs. Party-00[1-5].jpg.lnk (2014). Finally, the theme of party pictures and stock-JPGs used in both the 2017 and 2014 campaigns are extremely similar.” states the analysis. “Another possible similarity is the use of some of the code from the Java Reverse Metasploit-Stager [6] in the exploits previously analyzed by FireEye [7] as well as the PhotoShow.jar payload.”

The most popular campaign attributed to the APT17 group is the attack on the Google’s infrastructure, also known as Operation Aurora. For almost a decade the APT17 targeted government organizations in several Southeast Asian countries and the US, NGOs, defense contractors, law firms, IT firms, and mining companies.

The APT17 attempted to exploit the attention of the media on the HBO hack and the Game of Thrones leaks to increase the efficiency of their hacking campaign.

“Based on similarities in code, payload, file names, images, and themes, it is possible that this attack was carried out by a Chinese state-sponsored actor known as Deputy Dog.” concluded Proofpoint. “The use of a Game of Thrones lure during the penultimate season of the series follows a common threat actor technique of developing lures that are timely and relevant, and play on the human factor – the natural curiosity and desire to click that leads to so many malware infections. While Proofpoint systems blocked this attack, the use of such lures, combined with sophisticated delivery mechanisms and powerful tools like the latest version of the 9002 RAT can open wide doors into corporate data and systems for the actors behind these attacks”


North Korea-Linked Lazarus APT targets U.S. Defense contractors
15.8.2017 securityaffairs APT

The North Korea-linked Lazarus APT group as Lazarus is believed to be behind attacks targeting United States defense contractors.
According to Palo Alto Networks, the North Korea-linked Lazarus APT group as Lazarus is believed to be behind attacks targeting United States defense contractors.

The activity of the Lazarus APT Group surged in 2014 and 2015, its members used mostly custom-tailored malware in their attacks and experts that investigated on the crew consider it highly sophisticated.

This threat actor has been active since at least 2009, possibly as early as 2007, and it was involved in both cyber espionage campaigns and sabotage activities aimed to destroy data and disrupt systems. Security researchers discovered that North Korean Lazarus APT group was behind recent attacks on banks, including the Bangladesh cyber heist.

Lazarus APT

According to security experts, the group was behind, other large-scale cyber espionage campaigns against targets worldwide, including the Troy Operation, the DarkSeoul Operation, and the Sony Picture hack.

The Lazarus group, tracked by the U.S. government as Hidden Cobra, seems to be behind recent attacks against U.S. defense contractors, likely in cooperation with other hacker groups.

The last campaign conducted by the Lazarus APT leverages spear phishing emails containing weaponized Microsoft Office documents. The documents are written in English and embed malicious macros to deliver a malware.

The hackers used decoy documents describing job openings at some U.S. defense contractors, the hackers used the text of job descriptions available on the legitimate company’s website.

“Unit 42 researchers at Palo Alto Networks have discovered new attack activity targeting individuals involved with United States defense contractors. Through analysis of malicious code, files, and infrastructure it is clear the group behind this campaign is either directly responsible for or has cooperated with the group which conducted Operation Blockbuster Sequeland, ultimately, Operation Blockbuster (originally outlined by researchers from Novetta).” reads the analysis published by PaloAlto networks.

The macros used in this last campaign presents many similarities with other cyber espionage attacks attributed to the Lazarus APT, experts also found many links between the nature of the decoy document used, the payloads and the command and control (C&C) servers.

“Recently, we’ve identified weaponized Microsoft Office Document files which use the same malicious macros as attacks from earlier this year. Based on the contents of these latest decoy documents which are displayed to a victim after opening the weaponized document the attackers have switched targets from Korean language speakers to English language speakers. Most notably, decoy document themes now include job role descriptions and internal policies from US defense contractors.” continues the analysis.

“This reuse of macro source code, XOR keys used within the macro to decode implant payloads, and the functional overlap in the payloads the macros write to disk demonstrates the continued use of this tool set by this threat group. The use of an automated tool to build the weaponized documents would explain the common but not consistent reuse of metadata, payloads, and XOR keys within the documents,”

The experts highlighted that the tools and tactics used by the group have changed only little compared to previous cyber espionage campaigns, they have no doubt about the fact that threat actors will continue their operations.

I suggest reading the analysis that also includes Indicators of Compromise.


APT28 hackers are leveraging NSA Hacking tool to spy on Hotels guests
12.8.2017 securityaffairs APT

According to FireEye, the notorious Russia-linked APT28 group is behind an ongoing campaign targeting hotels in several European countries.
According to FireEye, the notorious Russia-linked APT28 group (Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear, Sofacy, Sednit and Strontium) is behind an ongoing campaign targeting hotels in several European countries.

The researchers observed many attacks targeting the networks of hotels to gain access the devices of government and business travelers via the guest Wi-Fi.

The hackers targeted several companies in the hospitality sector, including hotels in seven European countries and at least one in the Middle Eastern country.

The attack chain starts with a spear phishing email sent to a hotel employee, the messages use weaponized document named “Hotel_Reservation_Form.doc.” The embedded macros decode a dropper that delivers the GameFish malware. Experts noticed that the backdoor is the same used by the APT28 in a recent campaign that targeted Montenegro after the state officially joined NATO alliance despite the strong opposition from Russian Government that threatened to retaliate.

Once the hackers accessed the target network, they used the NSA-linked EternalBlue SMB exploit for lateral movements. According to the malware researchers at FireEye, this is the first time APT28 hackers had used this NSA exploit.

“APT28 is using novel techniques involving the EternalBlue exploit and the open source tool Responder to spread laterally through networks and likely target travelers. Once inside the network of a hospitality company, APT28 sought out machines that controlled both guest and internal Wi-Fi networks. No guest credentials were observed being stolen at the compromised hotels; however, in a separate incident that occurred in Fall 2016, APT28 gained initial access to a victim’s network via credentials likely stolen from a hotel Wi-Fi network.” reads the analysis published by FireEye.

The APT28 hackers also used the open source penetration testing tool Responder for NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) poisoning.

“Upon gaining access to the machines connected to corporate and guest Wi-Fi networks, APT28 deployed Responder. Responder facilitates NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) poisoning.

This technique listens for NBT-NS (UDP/137) broadcasts from victim computers attempting to connect to network resources. Once received, Responder masquerades as the sought-out resource and causes the victim computer to send the username and hashed password to the attacker-controlled machine. APT28 used this technique to steal usernames and hashed passwords that allowed escalation of privileges in the victim network,” continues FireEye.

The researchers reported details about an intrusion occurred in 2016, a user connected to a hotel’s Wi-Fi and 12 hours later APT28 hackers used stolen credentials to access his network and his Outlook Web Access (OWA) account.

This isn’t the first time hackers targeted travelers, the most important case is represented by the DarkHotel APT. The APT group targeted European hotels hosting participants in Iranian nuclear negotiations, and according to some reports, hackers spied on high-profile people visiting Russia and China.

“Cyber espionage activity against the hospitality industry is typically focused on collecting information on or from hotel guests of interest rather than on the hotel industry itself, though actors may also collect information on the hotel as a means of facilitating operations,” FireEye said. “Business and government personnel who are traveling, especially in a foreign country, must often rely on less secure systems to conduct business than at their home office, or may be unfamiliar with the additional threats posed while abroad.”


Kaspersky Details APT Trends for Q2 2017

11.8.2017 securityweek APT
While continuing to deploy their usual set of hacking tools onto compromised systems, advanced persistent threat (APT) actors were observed using leveraging zero-day vulnerabilities and quickly adopting new exploits during the second quarter of 2017, Kaspersky Lab reports.

According to the security company’s APT Trends report Q2 2017, threat actors such as Sofacy and Turla were observed using zero-day exploits targeting Microsoft’s Office and Windows products. The BlackOasis group too was associated with a zero-day that was quickly adopted by OilRig, while the Lazarus sub-group BlueNoroff adopted the National Security Agency-associated EternalBlue exploit.

In March and April, security researchers discovered three zero-day flaws the Sofacy and Turla Russian-speaking threat actors had been using in live attacks. Sofacy was associated with two vulnerabilities targeting Microsoft Office’s Encapsulated PostScript (CVE-2017-0262) and a Microsoft Windows Local Privilege Escalation (CVE-2017-0263), while Turla was targeting a different Office Encapsulated PostScript bug (CVE-2017-0261).

Both actors were observed dropping their usual payloads, namely GAMEFISH (Sofacy) and ICEDCOFFEE, also known as Shirime (Turla). The actors continued to target foreign ministries, governments, and other government-affiliated organizations in their attacks, Kaspersky reveals.

Sofacy was also seen experimenting with two new macro techniques, one leveraging the built-in ‘certutil’ utility in Microsoft Windows to extract a hardcoded payload within a macro, while the other was based on embedding Base64-encoded payloads within the EXIF metadata of malicious documents. Turla was observed using fake Adobe Flash installers for malware delivery.

In June, the BlackEnergy Russian-speaking actor launched the destructive NotPetya attack targeting organizations relying on the MEDoc software. Focused mainly on companies in Ukraine, the attack eventually hit around 65 countries worldwide, including Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Russia, and the United States.

The second quarter of the year also brought to the spotlight the activity of a cyber-espionage group called Longhorn. Revealed via Vault 7 files published by WikiLeaks, the group had been tracked by Kaspersky since 2014. The firm discovered at least three families of tools associated with the actor, and calls them Gray Lambert, Red Lambert, and Brown Lambert.

The malware can “orchestrate multiple sniffer victims on a network via broadcast, multicast, and unicast commands, allowing the operators to employ surgical precision in networks with many infected machines. The sniffers double as next-stage payload delivery mechanisms for an infected network. A notable feature of the Lambert campaigns is the level of precision with which targets are chosen; Gray Lambert’s victimology is primarily focused on strategic verticals in Asia and Middle East,” Kaspersky says.

A global malware attack that caught everyone’s attention in May was WannaCry, and security researchers eventually linked the attack to North Korea-tied Lazarus group (specifically, the sub-group called BlueNoroff, which is currently using the Manuscrypt backdoor to target financial organizations).

WannaCry was leveraging the EternalBlue exploit that ShadowBrokers made public in April (after Microsoft patched it in March) and which was supposedly stolen from the NSA-linked Equation group. WannaCry was accidentally stopped by a British researcher currently under arrest in the U.S. for his alleged involvement in the development and distribution of Kronos banking Trojan.

Another zero-day exploit (CVE-2017-0199) discovered in the second quarter of the year had been actively used by BlackOasis, a Middle Eastern actor observed using other zero-days in the past as well, and associated with the ‘lawful surveillance’ kit FinSpy. Soon after CVE-2017-0199 became public, another Middle Eastern actor adopted it, namely OilRig, which has been targeting organizations in Israel.

Other actors have been active during the second quarter of the year as well, including Chinese-speaking threat groups, but they continued to use their known tools in previously established manners. However, a new piece of MacOS malware called Demsty and targeting University researchers in Hong Kong, among others, did emerge in the timeframe (but Kaspersky isn’t yet certain that a Chinese-speaking actor is behind it).

Kaspersky also mentions the ShadowBrokers group in their APT report, referring to their activity of “dumping multiple tools and documentation allegedly stolen from Equation Group.” In April, the group leaked information suggesting that the NSAs had penetrated the SWIFT banking network to monitor the activity of various Middle East banks.


Experts found a link between the KONNI attacks and DarkHotel campaigns against NK
10.8.2017 securityaffairs APT

Experts at Cylance noticed that the decoy document used in KONNI attacks is similar to the one used in recent campaigns of the DarkHotel APT.
In May, Cisco Talos team discovered a RAT dubbed KONNI malware that targets organizations linked to North Korea.

The malware, dubbed by researchers “KONNI,” was undetected for more than 3 years and was used in highly targeted attacks. It was able to avoid detection due to a continuous evolution, the recent versions capable of executing arbitrary code on the target systems and stealing data.

“Talos has discovered an unknown Remote Administration Tool that we believe has been in use for over 3 years. During this time it has managed to avoid scrutiny by the security community. The current version of the malware allows the operator to steal files, keystrokes, perform screenshots, and execute arbitrary code on the infected host. Talos has named this malware KONNI. ” states the analysis published by Talos.

The malware has evolved over the years and its last release is able to log keystrokes, steal files, capture screenshots, and collect information about the infected system.

The KONNI malware was also spotted in at least two campaigns in 2017. Threat actors used a decoy document titled “Pyongyang e-mail lists – April 2017” and it contained the email addresses and phone numbers of individuals working at organizations such as the United Nations, UNICEF and embassies linked to North Korea.

Hackers also used a second decoy document, titled “Inter Agency List and Phonebook – April 2017” contained names and contact information for members of agencies, embassies and other organizations linked to North Korea.

Experts at Cylance noticed that the decoy document titled “Pyongyang e-mail lists – April 2017, presents many similarities with a document used in a recent campaign that experts at Bitdefender linked to DarkHotel.

The first Darkhotel espionage campaign was spotted by experts at Kaspersky Lab in late 2014, according to the researchers the APT group has been around for nearly a decade while targeting selected corporate executives traveling abroad.

According to the experts, threat actors behind the Darkhotel campaign aimed to steal sensitive data from executives while they are staying in luxury hotels, the worrying news is that the hacking crew is still active.

The attackers appeared high skilled professionals that exfiltrated data of interest with a surgical precision and deleting any trace of their activity. The researchers noticed that the gang never go after the same target twice.

According to the security firm Bitdefender, the DarkHotel APT is back and it is targeting government employees with an interest in North Korea with new techniques.

The hackers’ victims have been discovered in several countries, including North Korea, Russia, South Korea, Japan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Taiwan, China, the United States, India, Mozambique, Indonesia and Germany.

The new DarkHotel campaign dubbed “Inexsmar” leveraged on documents quite similar to the ones used in the KONNI attacks, the content has the same format and they have the same title.

Konni darkhotel

Looking at the files’ description it is possible to notice that they are both titled “Pyongyang directory” and they were both authored by “Divya Jacob.”

Konni darkhotel 2

Experts at Cylance who analyzed the KONNI malware believe that the malware’s authors once discovered due to their revelations will switch tactic and will release new variants that will include better obfuscation capabilities.

“The KONNI malware is a relatively new RAT. The implemented features are straightforward to analyze and there has been little attempt to mask the malware’s true purpose. The basic features for a backdoor are all present, including host profiling and remote access and control. ” concluded Cylance.

“Given the recent attention, we expect to see new variants surface in the coming months with better obfuscation and perhaps additional capabilities.”


APT Trends report Q2 2017
8.8.2017 Kaspersky 
APT 

Introduction

Since 2014, Kaspersky Lab’s Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) has been providing threat intelligence reports to a wide-range of customers worldwide, leading to the delivery of a full and dedicated private reporting service. Prior to the new service offering, GReAT published research online for the general public in an effort to help combat the ever-increasing threat from nation-state and other advanced actors. Since we began offering a threat intelligence service, all deep technical details on advanced campaigns are first pushed to our subscriber base. At the same time, to remain true to our efforts to help make the internet safer, important incidents, such as WannaCry or Petya are covered in both private and public reports.

Kaspersky’s Private Threat Intelligence Portal (TIP)
In Q1 of 2017 we published our first APT Trends report, highlighting our top research findings over the last few months. We will continue to publish quarterly reports as a representative snapshot of what has been offered in greater detail in our private reports in order to highlight significant events and findings we feel most users should be aware of. If you would like to learn more about our intelligence reports or request more information for a specific report, readers are encouraged to contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com.

Russian-Speaking Actors

The second quarter of 2017 has seen multiple incidents involving Russian-speaking threat actors. Topping the list of ‘attention grabbers’ were the Sofacy and Turla threat actors.

March and April started off with a bang, with the discovery of three zero-day exploits being used in-the-wild by Sofacy and Turla: two of these targeted Microsoft Office’s Encapsulated PostScript (EPS) and the third being a Microsoft Windows Local Privilege Escalation (LPE). Sofacy was discovered utilizing both CVE-2017-0262 (an EPS vulnerability) and CVE-2017-0263 (LPE) over the Easter holiday, targeting a swath of users throughout Europe. Prior to this attack, Turla was also discovered using CVE-2017-0261 (a different EPS vulnerability). Neither actor appeared to deviate from their usual payload repertoire, with Sofacy dropping their typical GAMEFISH payload and Turla utilizing what we refer to as ICEDCOFFEE (a.k.a. Shirime). Targeting for these attacks was also directly within the normal wheelhouse for both actors, focusing mainly on foreign ministries, governments, and other government-affiliated organizations.

GReAT produced additional reports on Sofacy and Turla beyond those mentioned above. In April, we notified customers of two new experimental macro techniques utilized by Sofacy. These techniques, while not particularly sophisticated, caught our attention as they had not been seen before in-the-wild. The first technique involved using the built-in ‘certutil’ utility in Microsoft Windows to extract a hardcoded payload within a macro. The second technique involved embedding Base64-encoded payloads within the EXIF metadata of the malicious documents. While the targeting for this new set of activity was again fairly standard, we discovered some noteworthy targeting against a French political party member prior to the 2017 elections. Moving into May and June, we wrote two additional reports of interest involving these two actors: the first was an update on the long running “Mosquito Turla” campaign showing the usage of fake Adobe Flash installers and continued targeting of foreign Ministries. The other documented yet another update on Sofacy’s unique Delphi payload we call ‘Zebrocy’.

June saw the massive outbreak of a piece of malware dubbed “ExPetr”. While initial assessments presumed that this was yet another ransomware attack à la WannaCry, a deeper assessment by GReAT places the initial intent as constituting an operation destructive in nature. We were also able to confidently identify the initial distribution of the malware, as well as indicate a low confidence assessment that the attacks may share traits with the BlackEnergy actors.

Below is a summary of report titles produced for the Eastern European region only. As stated above, if you would like to learn more about our threat intelligence products or request more information on a specific report, please direct inquiries to intelreports@kaspersky.com.
Sofacy Dabbling in New Macro Techniques
Sofacy Using Two Zero Days in Recent Targeted Attacks – early warning
Turla EPS Zero Day – early warning
Mosquito Turla Targets Foreign Affairs Globally
Update on Zebrocy Activity June 2017
ExPetr motivation and attribution – Early alert
BlackBox ATM attacks using SDC bus injection
English-Speaking Actors

English-speaking actors are always particularly fascinating due to their history of complex tooling and campaigns. Actors like Regin and Project Sauron have proven fascinating examples of new techniques leveraged in long-lasting, hard to catch campaigns and as such make ideal subjects for further research. Not to be outdone, Equation and the Lamberts were the subjects of our most recent investigations.

Continuing our practice of conducting malware paleontology while integrating new discoveries, we published a report on EQUATIONVECTOR, an Equation backdoor first used as early as 2006. This backdoor is a fascinating passive-active shellcode staging implant. It’s one of the earliest noted instances of a NObody But US (‘NOBUS’) backdoor for staging further attacks. Despite its age, the EQUATIONVECTOR backdoor (identified as ‘PeddleCheap’ in the latest ShadowBrokers disclosures) incorporates many advanced techniques for prolonged stealthy operations in victim networks, allowing the Equation operators to deliver further payloads without arousing suspicion. The report tracks the development of these tools through subsequent iterations year-by-year.

Our tracking of the Lamberts toolkit continues with the publication of the Gray Lambert report in June, the most advanced Lambert known to date. This too is a NOBUS backdoor, a passive implant operating strictly in user-land. The intricate usefulness of Gray Lambert lies in its ability to orchestrate multiple sniffer victims on a network via broadcast, multicast, and unicast commands, allowing the operators to employ surgical precision in networks with many infected machines. The sniffers double as next-stage payload delivery mechanisms for an infected network. A notable feature of the Lambert campaigns is the level of precision with which targets are chosen; Gray Lambert’s victimology is primarily focused on strategic verticals in Asia and Middle East. During this investigation, GReAT researchers have also discovered two additional Lambert families (Red Lambert and Brown Lambert) currently under investigation for Q3. Below is a list of report titles for reference:
EQUATIONVECTOR – A Generational Breakdown of the PeddleCheap Multifunctional Backdoor
The Gray Lambert – A Leap in Sophistication to User-land NOBUS Passive Implants
Korean-speaking Actors

Our researchers focusing on attacks with a Korean nexus also had a very busy quarter, producing seven reports on the Lazarus group and WannaCry attacks. Most of the reports on Lazarus directly involved a sub-group we refer to as BlueNoroff. They are the arm that focuses mainly on financial gain, targeting banks, ATMs, and other “money-makers”. We revealed to customers a previously unknown piece of malware dubbed ‘Manuscrypt’ used by Lazarus to target not only diplomatic targets in South Korea, but also people using virtual currency and electronic payment sites. Most recently, ‘Manuscrypt’ has become the primary backdoor used by the BlueNoroff sub-group to target financial institutions.

WannaCry also created quite a stir in the second quarter, with our analysts producing three reports and multiple blog posts on this emerging threat. What proved most interesting to us, was the probable linkage to Lazarus group as the source of the attacks, as well as the origins of the malware. GReAT researchers were able to trace back some of its earliest usage and show that before the ‘EternalBlue’ exploit was added to version 2, WannaCry v1 was used in spearphishing attacks months prior. Here is a listing of our reports from Q2 on actors with a Korean nexus:
Manuscrypt – malware family distributed by Lazarus
Lazarus actor targets carders
Lazarus-linked ATM Malware On the Loose In South Korea
Lazarus targets electronic currency operators
WannaCry – major ransomware attack hitting businesses worldwide – early alert
WannaCry possibly tied to the Lazarus APT Group
The First WannaCry Spearphish and Module Distribution
Middle Eastern Actors

While there wasn’t much high-end activity involving Middle Eastern actors, we did produce two reports revolving around the use of a zero-day exploit (CVE-2017-0199). The most notable involved an actor we refer to as BlackOasis and their usage of the exploit in-the-wild prior to its discovery. We have previously reported on BlackOasis using other zero-days in the past; CVE-2016-4117 in May 2016, CVE-2016-0984 in June 2015, and CVE-2015-5119 in June 2015. It is believed that BlackOasis is a customer of Gamma Group and utilizes the popular ‘lawful surveillance’ kit FinSpy. Other than the usage of the exploit, this report was significant because it also showed one of the earliest known uses of a new version of FinSpy, which is still being analyzed by our researchers.

After the discovery of CVE-2017-0199, a plethora of threat actors also began to leverage this exploit in their attacks. We reported to customers on the usage of this exploit by a well-known Middle Eastern actor dubbed ‘OilRig’. OilRig has actively targeted many organizations in Israel with the exploit via spearphishes appearing to originate from well-known doctors within Ben Gurion University. While their execution was less than stellar, it highlighted the widespread usage of this exploit shortly after its discovery.
OilRig exploiting CVE-2017-0199 in new campaign
BlackOasis using Ole2Link zero day exploit in the wild
Chinese-Speaking Actors

On the Chinese speaking front, we felt it necessary to produce two reports to our customers. While Chinese speaking actors are active on a daily basis, not much has changed and we prefer to avoid producing reports on ‘yet another instance of APTxx’ for the sake of padding our numbers. Instead we try to focus on new and exciting campaigns that warrant special attention.

One of those reports detailed a new finding regarding a fileless version of the well-known ‘HiKit’ malware dubbed ‘Hias’. We have reported on Hias in the past, and one of our researchers was finally able to discover the persistence mechanism used, which also allowed us to tie the activity to an actor we call ‘CloudComputating’.

Another report detailed a new campaign we referred to as ‘IndigoZebra’. This campaign was targeting former Soviet Republics with a wide swath of malware including Meterpreter, Poison Ivy, xDown, and a previously unknown malware called ‘xCaon’. This campaign shares ties with other well-known Chinese-speaking actors, but no definitive attribution has been made at this time.
Updated technical analysis of Hias RAT
IndigoZebra – Intelligence preparation to high-level summits in Middle Asia
Best of the rest

Sometimes we find new and exciting campaigns or entirely new threat actors to report to our subscribers without being able to make an immediate or definitive determination on regional provenance. Several reports fell into this category in the last quarter. ChasingAdder is a report describing a new persistence technique that hijacked a legitimate WMI DLL for the purposes of loading a malicious payload. This activity targeted high-profile diplomatic, military, and research organizations beginning in the fall of 2016, but to date we have not been able to pinpoint the specific actor responsible.

Demsty is a new piece of MacOS malware that is targeting University researchers in Hong Kong, among others. At the time of writing, we have a low confidence assessment that the campaign was conducted by Chinese-speaking actors, and thus categorize this as ‘Unknown’ until greater evidence comes to light.

During Q2, the mischievous ShadowBrokers also continued their regular activities dumping multiple tools and documentation allegedly stolen from Equation Group. In April, the ShadowBrokers released another dump of information detailing the alleged targeting of SWIFT service bureaus and other banks by Equation Group. Since some of our customers are financial entities, we found it necessary to evaluate the data and provide an expert’s opinion on the validity of the dump.

Reports in the ‘unknown’ category:
ShadowBrokers’ Lost in translation leak – SWIFT attacks analysis
ChasingAdder – WMI DLL Hijacking Trojan Targeting High Profile Victims
University Researchers Located in Hong Kong Targeted with Demsty
Predictions

Based on the trends we’ve seen over the last three months, as well as foreseeable geopolitical events, we have listed a few predictions for the upcoming quarter (Q3). As always, this isn’t an exact science and some cases won’t come to fruition. Analyzing current and future events and combining those with the motivations of known active actors can help organizations prepare for likely forthcoming activity:
Misinformation campaigns will remain a threat to countries with upcoming elections, specifically Germany and Norway, as they have been previous targets for Eastern European based actors.
‘Lawful Surveillance’ tools will continue to be utilized by governments that don’t have well-established Cyber Operations capabilities, mainly based out of the Middle East. Companies such as Gamma Group, Hacking Team, and NSO will continue to offer new zero-day exploits to those customers. As prices increase and exchanges thrive, new organizations and marketplaces will continue popping up.
Destructive malware disguised as ransomware will continue to be a problem. In the last quarter we’ve seen two instances of this, and with the continued release of tools / exploits from dumps like Vault7 and ShadowBrokers, this is going to be a new alarming trend to deal with.
In China, the past months have been marked by the dwindling economic growth, rising tensions with North Korea and the US, and increased exchanges between South Korean / Japanese / American organizations. In addition to these, the 19th Party Congress is set to be held in the fall of 2017 and according to multiple public predictions, it is likely that some major changes will happen in the leadership. It’s possible that these events will have wide regional influences that could affect the way that threat actors operate in Asia, both in terms of targeting and TTPs.
Targeting energy-related companies and organizations will be on the rise. Countries such as Norway may be a top target moving forward given their control on oil and gas in the region in the buildup to an election. Saudi Arabia will also top the charts for potential targeting as they have in years past.
Lower-tier threat actors continue to increase cyber-espionage efforts and capabilities both in complexity and size. Expect more activity with varied technical capabilities coming from lesser known or previously unseen actors.
How to keep yourself protected

One of the biggest problems when it comes to leveraging threat intelligence is judging the quality of the data and how it can be used for defense. For instance, we may observe an increase in the number of fileless attacks or attacks in which all IOCs are unique or specific per victim. In such situations, having not only host-based IOCs, but also network IOCs and Yara rules that can help identify malware in all cases is very important.

Another problem comes from the fact that many threat intelligence providers have a limited world view and their data covers only a small set of threats. It’s easy for an enterprise to fall into the trap of thinking that ‘actor X’ is not something they need to worry because their focus has been only certain countries or certain industry sectors; only to discover later that their ignorance left them blind to those attacks.

As shown by many incidents, but especially by WannaCry and ExPetr’s EternalBlue-based spreading subroutines, vulnerabilities remain a key approach to infecting systems. Therefore timely patching is of utmost importance – which, being one of the most tedious IT maintenance tasks, works much better with good automation. Kaspersky Endpoint Security for Business Advanced and Kaspersky Total Security include Vulnerability & Patch management components, offering convenient tools for making patching much easier, and much less time-consuming for IT staff.

Given the above, it is highly recommended that prevention (such as endpoint protection) along with advanced detection capabilities, such as a solution that can detect all types of anomalies and scrutinize suspicious files at a deeper level, be present on users’ systems. The Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack solution (KATA) matches events coming from different infrastructure levels, discerns anomalies and aggregates them into incidents, while also studying related artifacts in a safe environment of a sandbox. As with most Kaspersky products, KATA is powered by HuMachine Intelligence, which is backed by on premise and in lab-running machine learning processes coupled with real-time analyst expertise and our understanding of threat intelligence big data.

The best way to prevent attackers from finding and leveraging security holes, is to eliminate the holes altogether, including those involving improper system configurations or errors in proprietary applications. For this, Kaspersky Penetration Testing and Application Security Assessment services can become a convenient and highly effective solution, providing not only data on found vulnerabilities, but also advising on how to fix it, further strengthening corporate security.


Tech Firms Target Domains Used by Russia-linked Threat Group

26.7.2017 securityweeek APT

Tech companies ThreatConnect and Microsoft are moving toward exposing and taking down domains associated with Russia-linked threat group known as Fancy Bear.

Also tracked as APT28, Pawn Storm, Sofacy, Tsar Team, Strontium and Sednit, the threat group has been associated with a variety of high-profile cyber-attacks aimed at government and other types of organizations worldwide.

Last year, the threat group was said to have orchestrated election-related hacker attacks in the United States. The actor allegedly developed the so called XTunnel malware specifically to compromise the Democrat National Committee (DNC) network last year, and was said in February 2017 to be using brand new Mac malware to steal data.

ThreatConnect says their team was able to identify “dozens of recently registered domains and IPs that have varying levels of association to the Russian APT.” Moreover, the security firm discovered three name servers the group most likely used for domains, which allows defenders to “proactively identify new domains that may be associated with Fancy Bear activity”.

One of the domains, the security company reveals, is unisecproper[.]org, which was registered using the email address le0nard0@mail[.]com and is hosted on a dedicated server at the IP 92.114.92.134. The certificate used by this domain has been already associated (PDF) with Fancy Bear in operations targeting the DNC and German Parliament, which clearly indicates that the domain is associated with the group.

Using the SSL certificate, ThreatConnect discovered recent IPs associated with Fancy Bear, along with numerous domains hosted on these IPs, also supposedly associated with the threat group. Some of these domains were discovered in previous investigations as well.

The researchers also managed to find name servers used by Fancy Bear, including nemohosts[.]com, bacloud[.]com, and laisvas[.]lt. The investigation eventually led to the discovery of hundreds of domains associated with these name servers, tens of which were hosted on dedicated servers.

The researchers note these are suspicious domains but note that “consistencies in registration and hosting tactics do not definitively associate many of these suspicious domains with previous malicious, Fancy Bear activity.”

“It's important to caveat our confidence in these indicators' association to FANCY BEAR activity. For many of those indicators that we've included here, we don't know whether they have actually been used maliciously. But if known bad is all that you are worried about or interested in, then you'll always be at least one step behind the attacker. Only by leveraging intelligence to identify and exploit our adversaries' tactics can we move from a reactive, whack-a-mole state to a proactive, informed defense,” ThreatConnect says.

Microsoft, in the meantime, is taking legal action against Fancy Bear: the tech company filed a civil lawsuit in August 2016, seeking to seize command-and-control (C&C) domains used by the group. According to court documentation Microsoft made public, there are hundreds of domains containing Microsoft trademarks that it is looking to take control of.

The actors failed to appear in a federal court in Virginia to defend themselves, and Microsoft is pushing for a default judgment in its favor. By seizing the domains, Microsoft would be able to cut the group off from communicating with infected systems.

“Microsoft seeks a preliminary injunction directing the registries associated with these Internet domains to take all steps necessary to disable access to and operation of these Internet domains to ensure that changes or access to the Internet domains cannot be made absent a court order and that all content and material associated with these Internet domains are to be isolated and preserved pending resolution of the dispute. Microsoft seeks a permanent injunction, other equitable relief and damages,” Microsoft notes.

Previously, Microsoft used legal action to take down botnets. In 2012, as part of Operation b71, the company seized C&C servers associated with the notorious Zeus family of malware. In 2014, in an attempt to take down the Bladabindi (njRAT) and Jenxcus (NJw0rm) malware families, the company seized 23 No-IP domains to route bad traffic to a sinkhole.


Experts detailed the new Operation Wilted Tulip campaign of the CopyKittens APT
26.7.2017 securityaffairs
APT

Researchers from ClearSky and Trend Micro uncovered a new massive cyber espionage campaign conducted by CopyKittens dubbed ‘Operation Wilted Tulip’
A joint investigation conducted by experts from the Israeli cyber-intelligence firm by ClearSky and Trend Micro uncovered a new massive cyber espionage campaign dubbed ‘Operation Wilted Tulip’ conducted by an Iran-linked APT group CopyKittens (aka Rocket Kittens).

CopyKittens report

The hackers targeted government and academic organizations in various countries, according to the experts the group has been active since at least since 2013.

In 2015, ClearSky detected new activity from the Rocket kitten APT group against 550 targets, most of which are located in the Middle East.

The CopyKittens hackers targeted organisations and individuals in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United States, Jordan and Germany.

The joint report published by ClearSky and Trend Micro includes details on the Operation Wilted Tulip and described the TTPs (techniques, tactics, and procedures) adopted by the Rocket Kittens APT group.
“CopyKittens use several self-developed malware and hacking tools that have not been publicly reported to date, and are analyzed in this report: TDTESS backdoor; Vminst, a lateral movement tool; NetSrv, a Cobalt Strike loader; and ZPP, a files compression console program. The group also uses Matryoshka v1, a selfdeveloped RAT analyzed by ClearSky in the 2015 report, and Matryoshka v2 which is a new version, albeit with
similar functionality. The group often uses the trial version of Cobalt Strike3 , a publicly available commercial software for “Adversary Simulations and Red Team Operations.” states the report .

“Other public tools used by the group are Metasploit, a well-known free and open source framework for developing and executing exploit code against a remote target machine;
Mimikatz, a post-exploitation tool that performs credential dumping; and Empire, “a PowerShell and Python post-exploitation agent.” For detection and exploitation of internet-facing web servers, CopyKittens use Havij, Acunetix and sqlmap.”

The hackers used both spear phishing attacks and watering holes to compromise target systems.

CopyKittens compromised websites of media outlets and organizations to deliver its malware. Among the websites compromised by hackers to conduct watering hole attacks, there is The Jerusalem Post, the Maariv news and IDF Disabled Veterans Organization.

Below the full list of methods used by CopyKittens in its campaigns.

Watering hole attacks – inserting malicious JavaScript code into breached strategic websites.
Web based exploitation – emailing links to websites built by the attackers and containing known exploits.
Malicious documents – email attachments containing weaponized Microsoft Office documents.
Fake social media entities – fake personal and organizational Facebook pages are used for interaction with targets and for information gathering.
Web hacking – Havij, Acuntix and sqlmap are used to detect and exploit internet-facing web servers.
The hackers used multiple tools and malware to infect targets, they used both custom malicious codes and commercial solutions like Cobalt Strike.the report!


Spring Dragon APT used more than 600 Malware samples in different attacks
25.7.207 securityaffairs
APT

The threat actor behind Spring Dragon APT has been developing and updating its wide range of tools throughout the years, new attacks reported in South Asia.
According to a new report published by Kaspersky Lab, the China-linked APT group Spring Dragon (aka Lotus Blossom, Elise, and Esile) has used more than 600 malware samples in its attacks over the past years.
The Spring Dragon APT group is a state-sponsored group that has been around since at least 2012, but further evidence collected by the researchers suggests that it may have been active since 2007.

The APT group focused its cyber espionage campaigns on military and government organizations in Southeast Asia.
In June 2015, Trend Micro published a report on a targeted attack campaign of the group that hit organizations in various countries in the Southeast Asian region. The experts speculated the involvement of state-sponsored hackers due to the nature of the stolen information.

“The Esile targeted attack campaign targeting various countries in the Southeast Asian region has been discussed in the media recently. This campaign – which was referred to by other researchers as Lotus Blossom – is believed to be the work of a nation-state actor due to the nature of the stolen information, which is more valuable to countries than either private companies or cybercriminals.” wrote Trend Micro.

In October 2015, the Lotus Blossom group launched a new espionage campaign using fake invitations to Palo Alto Networks’ Cybersecurity Summit held in Jakarta, on November 3.

Back to the present, researchers from Kaspersky Lab were informed by a research partner in Taiwan of a new wave of attacks powered by the APT group.

“Information about the new attacks arrived from a research partner in Taiwan and we decided to review the actor’s tools, techniques and activities.” states the analysis from Kaspersky Lab.

“Using Kaspersky Lab telemetry data we detected the malware in attacks against some high-profile organizations around the South China Sea.”

The hackers also targeted political parties, educational institutions, and companies in the telecommunications industry.

Most infections were observed in countries around the South China Sea, including Taiwan, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand.

Spring Dragon attacks

Spring Dragon is known for spear phishing and watering hole attacks, malware researchers at Kaspersky Lab collected a large set composed of more than 600 malware samples used in different attacks.
The APT group has a huge cyber arsenal, it has been developing and updating its range of tools throughout across the years. The hackers have various backdoor modules with unique characteristics and functionalities, it manages a large Command and Control infrastructure that includes more than 200 unique IP addresses and C&C domains.

Most C&C servers used by Spring Dragon are located in Hong Kong and the United States, other servers have also been found in Germany, China and Japan.

“The large number of samples which we have managed to collect have customized configuration data, different sets of C2 addresses with new hardcoded campaign IDs, as well as customized configuration data for creating a service for malware on a victim’s system. This is designed to make detection more difficult.” continues the analysis.

“All the backdoor modules in the APT’s toolset are capable of downloading more files onto the victim’s machine, uploading files to the attacker’s servers, and also executing any executable file or any command on the victim’s machine. These functionalities enable the attackers to undertake different malicious activities on the victim’s machine.”

The analysis of the malware compilation timestamps revealed that attackers might be in the GMT+8 time zone, the same of countries like China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Singapore, Taiwan, the Philippines and Western Australia.

Another interesting information emerged from the analysis is that the malware has been compiled by two different groups, one of which may be in Europe.

“It also suggests that either there is a second group working another shift in the same time zone or the attackers are cross-continental and there is another group, possibly in Europe. The uneven distribution of timestamps (low activity around 10am, 7-8pm UTC) suggests that the attackers didn’t change the timestamps to random or constant values and they might be real.” states the analysis.

“The number of malware samples which we managed to collect (over 600) for the group surpassed many others, and suggests an operation on a massive scale. It’s possible that this malware toolkit is offered in specialist public or private forums to any buyers, although, to date, we haven’t seen this.”


Spring Dragon – Updated Activity
24.7.2017 Kaspersky 
APT

Spring Dragon is a long running APT actor that operates on a massive scale. The group has been running campaigns, mostly in countries and territories around the South China Sea, since as early as 2012. The main targets of Spring Dragon attacks are high profile governmental organizations and political parties, education institutions such as universities, as well as companies from the telecommunications sector.

In the beginning of 2017, Kaspersky Lab became aware of new activities by an APT actor we have been tracking for several years called Spring Dragon (also known as LotusBlossom).

Information about the new attacks arrived from a research partner in Taiwan and we decided to review the actor’s tools, techniques and activities.

Using Kaspersky Lab telemetry data we detected the malware in attacks against some high-profile organizations around the South China Sea.

Spring Dragon is known for spear phishing and watering hole techniques and some of its tools have previously been analyzed and reported on by security researchers, including Kaspersky Lab. We collected a large set (600+) of malware samples used in different attacks, with customized C2 addresses and campaign codes hardcoded in the malware samples.

Spring Dragon’s Toolset

The threat actor behind Spring Dragon APT has been developing and updating its range of tools throughout the years it has been operational. Its toolset consists of various backdoor modules with unique characteristics and functionalities.

The threat actor owns a large C2 infrastructure which comprises more than 200 unique IP addresses and C2 domains.

The large number of samples which we have managed to collect have customized configuration data, different sets of C2 addresses with new hardcoded campaign IDs, as well as customized configuration data for creating a service for malware on a victim’s system. This is designed to make detection more difficult.

All the backdoor modules in the APT’s toolset are capable of downloading more files onto the victim’s machine, uploading files to the attacker’s servers, and also executing any executable file or any command on the victim’s machine. These functionalities enable the attackers to undertake different malicious activities on the victim’s machine.

A detailed analysis of known malicious tools used by this threat actor is available for customers of Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Services.

Command and Control (C2) Infrastructure

The main modules in Spring Dragon attacks are backdoor files containing IP addresses and domain names of C2 servers. We collected and analyzed information from hundreds of C2 IP addresses and domain names used in different samples of Spring Dragon tools that have been compiled over the years.

In order to hide their real location, attackers have registered domain names and used IP addresses from different geographical locations. The chart below shows the distribution of servers based on geographical location which the attackers used as their C2 servers.

Distribution chart of C2 servers by country

More than 40% of all the C2 servers used for Spring Dragon’s operations are located in Hong Kong, which hints at the geographical region (Asia) of the attackers and/or their targets. The next most popular countries are the US, Germany, China and Japan.

Targets of the Attacks

As was mentioned, the Spring Dragon threat actor has been mainly targeting countries and territories around the South China Sea with a particular focus on Taiwan, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Thailand.

Our research shows that the main targets of the attacks are in the following sectors and industries:

High-profile governmental organizations
Political parties
Education institutions, including universities
Companies from the telecommunications sector
The following map shows the geographic distribution of attacks according to our telemetry, with the frequency of the attacks increasing from yellow to red.

Geographic map of attacks

Origin of the Attacks

The victims of this threat actor have always been mainly governmental organizations and political parties. These are known to be of most interest to state-supported groups.

The type of malicious tools the actor has implemented over time are mostly backdoor files capable of stealing files from victims’ systems, downloading and executing additional malware components as well as running system commands on victims’ machines. This suggests an intention to search and manually collect information (cyberespionage). This activity is most commonly associated with the interests of state-sponsored attackers.

As a routine analysis procedure, we decided to figure out the attacker’s possible time zone using the malware compilation timestamps from a large number of Spring Dragon samples. The following diagram shows the frequency of the timestamps during daytime hours. The timestamps range from early 2012 until now and are aligned to the GMT time zone.

Assuming the peak working hours of malware developers are the standard working day of 09:00-17:00, the chart shows that compilation took place in the GMT+8 time zone. It also suggests that either there is a second group working another shift in the same time zone or the attackers are cross-continental and there is another group, possibly in Europe. The uneven distribution of timestamps (low activity around 10am, 7-8pm UTC) suggests that the attackers didn’t change the timestamps to random or constant values and they might be real.

Histogram of malware files’ timestamps

Conclusions

Spring Dragon is one of many long-running APT campaigns by unknown Chinese-speaking actors. The number of malware samples which we managed to collect (over 600) for the group surpassed many others, and suggests an operation on a massive scale. It’s possible that this malware toolkit is offered in specialist public or private forums to any buyers, although, to date, we haven’t seen this.

We believe that Spring Dragon is going to continue resurfacing regularly in the Asian region and it is therefore worthwhile having good detection mechanisms (such as Yara rules and network IDS signatures) in place. We will continue to track this group going forward and, should the actor resurface, we will provide updates on its new modus operandi.


Microsoft sued Fancy Bear to gain control of the domains used in the cyber espionage campaigns
22.7.2017 securityaffairs
APT

Microsoft used the lawsuit to disrupt a large number of cyber espionage campaigns conducted by infamous Fancy Bear APT hacking group
We have discussed several times about hacking back and the case we are going to analyze is a good example of an alternative approach to hit back an APT group.
Microsoft used the lawsuit to disrupt a large number of cyber espionage campaigns conducted by infamous Fancy Bear APT hacking group (APT28, Sofacy, Sednit, and Pawn Storm). The experts with the help of the authorities took over the command and control infrastructure of the group in order to analyze the traffic and the targets of the malware by using the lawsuit as a tool.

“A new offensive by Microsoft has been making inroads against the Russian government hackers behind last year’s election meddling, identifying over 120 new targets of the Kremlin’s cyber spying, and control-alt-deleting segments of Putin’s hacking apparatus.” reported the daily beast.

“How are they doing it? It turns out Microsoft has something even more formidable than Moscow’s malware: Lawyers.”
Microsoft sued Fancy Bear in a US federal court, accusing the APT group of computer intrusion, cybersquatting, and reserving several domain names that violate Microsoft’s trademarks.
Fancy Bear is active since at least 2007 and was one of the APT groups involved in the numerous cyber attacks against the US DNC and 2016 Presidential Election.

Numerous reports published by security firms linked the APT group to the GRU (General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate), the Russian secret military intelligence agency.
The experts at Microsoft observed Fancy Bear hackers often using domain names that look-alike Microsoft products and services, such as livemicrosoft[.]net and rsshotmail[.]com, for its cyber espionage campaigns.

The abuse was exploited by Microsoft to sue the hacking group with “unknown members” into the court of justice and gain the ownership of domains used by Fancy Bear to deliver malware.

“These servers can be thought of as the spymasters in Russia’s cyber espionage, waiting patiently for contact from their malware agents in the field, then issuing encrypted instructions and accepting stolen documents,” the report reads.

Fancy bear

Last year, the U.S. District Judge Gerald Bruce Lee granted Microsoft’s request and issued a then-sealed order to domain name registrars “compelling them to alter”the DNS of at least 70 Fancy Bear domains. The traffic was redirected to servers controlled by Microsoft.
Technically the procedure is called ‘sinkholing‘ and allows investigators to monitor the traffic from the infected systems to track the botnet infrastructure.

This is the precious work done by the Digital Crimes Unit that has identified the potential victims of the Russian APT.
“By analyzing the traffic coming to its sinkhole, the company’s security experts have identified 122 new cyber espionage victims, whom it’s been alerting through Internet service providers,” the report reads.

Microsoft is still waiting for a final judgment on the Fancy Bear case. The hearing has been scheduled on Friday in Virginia court.

“Microsoft concludes in court filings that its efforts have had “significant impact” on Fancy Bear’s operations. By analyzing the traffic coming to its sinkhole, the company’s security experts have identified 122 new cyber espionage victims, whom it’s been alerting through Internet service providers.” concludes the report.”On Friday, the company is set to ask Magistrate Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan for a final default judgment against Fancy Bear, and for a permanent injunction giving Microsoft ownership of the domains it’s seized.”


DarkHotel APT group leverages new methods to target politicians
21.7.2017 securityaffairs 
APT

According to Bitdefender, DarkHotel APT is back and it is targeting government employees with an interest in North Korea with a technique dubbed inexsmar.
According to the security firm Bitdefender, the DarkHotel APT is back and it is targeting government employees with an interest in North Korea with new techniques.

The hackers’ victims have been discovered in several countries, including North Korea, Russia, South Korea, Japan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Taiwan, China, the United States, India, Mozambique, Indonesia and Germany.

The first Darkhotel espionage campaign was spotted by experts at Kaspersky Lab in late 2014, according to the researchers the APT group has been around for nearly a decade while targeting selected corporate executives traveling abroad. According to the

According to the experts, threat actors behind the Darkhotel campaign aimed to steal sensitive data from executives while they are staying in luxury hotels, the worrying news is that the hacking crew is still active.

The attackers appeared high skilled professionals that exfiltrated data of interest with a surgical precision and deleting any trace of their activity. The researchers noticed that the gang never go after the same target twice. The list of targets includes CEOs, senior vice presidents, top R&D engineers, sales and marketing directors from the USA and Asia traveling for business in the APAC region.

Security researchers believe the APT group members are Korean speakers.

The attackers leveraged several methods to hack into the target systems, including zero-day exploits and used as the attack vectors peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing websites and hotel’s Wi-Fi.

Now the Darkhotel group was using new attack methods and an exploit leaked from Italian surveillance firm Hacking Team.

The attack technique used in recent attacks was dubbed Inexsmar and it was observed in targeted attacks against political figures.

“Our threat researchers have come across a very particular DarkHotel attack known as Inexsmar, which appears to mark a significant departure from the APT group’s traditional modus operandi. This sample dates back to September 2016 and seems to be used in a campaign that targets political figures rather than the usual corporate research and development personnel, CEOs and other senior corporate officials.” reads the analysis published by BitDefender.

“This attack uses a new payload delivery mechanism rather than the consacrated zero-day exploitation techniques, blending social engineering with a relatively complex Trojan to infect its selected pool of victims.”

Hackers spread a Trojan downloader via phishing emails, the malicious code is used to gather information on the infected device and sends it back to attackers. If the infected systems meet specific requirements a first stage downloader, disguised as a component of OpenSSL, is fetched. In this phase, the malicious code opens a document titled “Pyongyang e-mail lists – September 2016,” that contains email contacts for various organizations in Pyongyang.


The attack stops if the requirements are not satisfied, otherwise, another payload is delivered.

Unfortunately, at the time of the investigation, the C&C server was offline and researchers were not able to collect further details about the attack.

The use of a multi-stage downloader represents the major improvement compared to the use of exploits because it allows attackers to improve the distribution and the update of the malware.


'DarkHotel' APT Uses New Methods to Target Politicians

20.7.2017 securityweek APT

The DarkHotel threat group has been using some new methods in attacks aimed at government employees with an interest in North Korea, according to a report published this week by security firm Bitdefender.

The activities of the DarkHotel advanced persistent threat (APT) actor came to light in November 2014, when Kaspersky published a report detailing a sophisticated cyber espionage campaign targeting business travelers in the Asia-Pacific region. The group has been around for nearly a decade and some researchers believe its members are Korean speakers.

The attackers targeted their victims using several methods, including through their hotel’s Wi-Fi, zero-day exploits and peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing websites. Nearly one year later, the threat group was observed using new attack techniques and an exploit leaked from Italian spyware maker Hacking Team.

DarkHotel victims have been spotted in several countries, including North Korea, Russia, South Korea, Japan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Taiwan, China, the United States, India, Mozambique, Indonesia and Germany. Up until recently, the attacks appeared to focus on company executives, researchers and development personnel from sectors such as defense industrial base, military, energy, government, NGOs, electronics manufacturing, pharmaceutical, and medical.

In more recent DarkHotel attacks it has dubbed “Inexsmar,” security firm Bitdefender said the hackers targeted political figures, and they appeared to be using some new methods.

Bitdefender’s analysis is based on samples from September 2016. The initial Trojan downloader, delivered via phishing emails, collects information on the infected device and sends it back to its command and control (C&C) server. If the compromised system meets requirements (i.e. it belongs to an individual who is of interest), the first stage DarkHotel downloader, disguised as a component of OpenSSL, is fetched.

In the meantime, in an effort to avoid raising suspicion, the malware opens a document titled “Pyongyang e-mail lists - September 2016,” which provides a list of email contacts for various organizations in North Korea’s capital city.

If the system profile does not match what the attackers are looking for, the C&C server returns a “fail” string and the attack stops. If the attack continues, a second payload is retrieved.

When Bitdefender analyzed the malware samples, the C&C server was offline, making it impossible to know exactly who the victims were and how much damage was caused. However, Bitdefender’s Bogdan Botezatu told SecurityWeek that, based on the structure of the phishing message, the intended targets are most likely individuals working for governments or state institutions who have an interest in the political situation in North Korea.

Experts believe that the use of social engineering and a multi-stage downloader is an improvement compared to the direct use of exploits as it gives the attackers more flexibility in malware distribution and ensures that the Trojan remains up to date.


North Korea's DDoS Attacks Analyzed Based on IPs

20.6.2017 securityweek APT
Arbor Networks has used the IP addresses shared recently by United States authorities to analyze distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks attributed to the North Korean government. The security firm believes the data may not be as useful for organizations as the U.S. hopes.

Earlier this month, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) released a technical alert on behalf of the DHS and the FBI to warn organizations of North Korea’s Hidden Cobra activities, particularly its DDoS botnet infrastructure.

Hidden Cobra, a threat actor tracked by others as Lazarus Group, is believed to be behind several high-profile attacks, including the ones targeting Sony Pictures, Bangladesh’s central bank, and banks in Poland. Links have also been found between the group and the recent WannaCry ransomware attacks.

The US-CERT report focused on a DDoS tool dubbed DeltaCharlie. The organization has shared information on exploits, malware, IP addresses, file hashes, network signatures, and YARA rules associated with Hidden Cobra in an effort to help defenders detect the group’s attacks.

Data from Arbor Networks’ ATLAS infrastructure showed that 24 of the 632 IP addresses provided by US authorities were involved in at least one DDoS attack over a 105-day period between March 1 and June 13, 2017.

The company pointed out that its ATLAS infrastructure, which relies on data shared anonymously by nearly 400 globally distributed service providers, covers roughly one-third of Internet traffic, which means the actual number of IPs involved in attacks during this period is likely higher.

According to Arbor, 16 IPs participated in more than one of the 164 attacks observed by the company. The largest attack peaked at 4.3 Gbps, which is more than enough to disrupt unprotected systems, and the longest attack lasted for 44 hours.

While the largest concentration of IP addresses in the US-CERT report were in Russia, Arbor traced the highest percentage of IPs to Saudi Arabia (6 of 24) and the United Arab Emirates (5 of 24).

The IPs monitored by Arbor were involved in DDoS attacks on most days, but there were some periods with no activity. The longest period with no activity started on April 5, shortly after North Korea launched a missile into the Sea of Japan. While it’s unclear if the two events are in any way related, experts noted that DDoS attacks are often timed with significant geopolitical events.

Of the 164 DDoS attacks observed by researchers, nearly half were aimed at the United States, followed by the U.K., Australia, France, Saudi Arabia and Singapore.

SecurityWeek has reached out to several other DDoS protection companies, but none of them could immediately provide any information on the Hidden Cobra attacks.

Arbor said it conducted an analysis due to the fact that the US-CERT report, which the company has described as vague, was not clear on whether the IPs were bots or part of command and control (C&C) infrastructure, and it also failed to clarify if the IPs were “innocent” reflectors.

Arbor’s analysis – based on the types of attacks observed – suggests that the report lists open reflectors abused by DeltaCharlie and not the actual bots.

“This lack of context makes it difficult for responders to act. Security analysts would treat a list of command-and-control servers differently from a list of bots, and differently from a list of reflectors,” experts said. “Blindly loading such indicators into security systems could potentially cause more harm than good.”

This is not the first time the cybersecurity community has criticized a joint report from the FBI and the DHS. The report released late last year on GRIZZLY STEPPE activity, better known as Cozy Bear (APT29) and Fancy Bear (APT28 and Pawn Storm), failed to demonstrate that Russia was behind the U.S. election hacks.


Kasperagent malware used in a new campaign leveraging Palestine-Themed decoy files
18.6.2017 securityaffairs
APT

Researchers uncovered a new cyber espionage campaign involving the Kasperagent spyware delivered with Palestine-Themed decoy files.
In March, experts at security firm Qihoo 360 have spotted a cyber espionage campaign conducted by a threat actor tracked as APT-C-23 and Two-Tailed Scorpion.

A few weeks later, in April, researchers at Palo Alto Networks and ClearSky also shared the results of their investigation on the group.

The APT-C-23 group leverages Windows malware dubbed Kasperagent and Micropsia, and Android malware called SecureUpdate and Vamp in cyber attacks aimed mainly at Palestine. Victims of the group were also located in Israel, Egypt and the United States.

Malware experts at threat intelligence firm ThreatConnect have recently discovered tens of sample of the Kasperagent malware that had been compiled in April and May.

These samples dropped various decoy files associated with the Palestinian Authority tha is the body that governs the Palestinian Territories in the Middle East.

The documents are designed to appear as legitimate and most of them are publicly available on news websites or social media.

To trick victims into opening the documents, attackers used subjects such as the assassination of Hamas military leader Mazen Fuqaha, and banning of the Palestinian political party Fatah from Gaza.

“The first document – dated April 10, 2017 – is marked “Very Secret” and addressed to Yahya Al-Sinwar, who Hamas elected as its leader in Gaza in February 2017. Like the photo displayed in the first decoy file we found, this document references the death of Mazen Fuqaha. The Arabic-language text and English translation of the document are available in ThreatConnect here.” reads the analysis published by ThreatConnect.

kasperagent malware campaign

Crooks used the Kasperagent malware as a reconnaissance tool and downloader, anyway recent samples detected by the experts include additional capabilities, such as password stealing from browsers, taking screenshots and logging keystroke.

“However, some of the recently identified files display “extended-capability” including the functionality to steal passwords, take screenshots, log keystrokes, and steal files. These “extended-capability” samples called out to an additional command and control domain, stikerscloud[.]com.” continues the report. “Additionally, early variants of KASPERAGENT used “Chrome” as the user agent, while more recent samples use “OPAERA” – a possible misspelling of the “Opera” – browser. The indicators associated with the blog article are available in the ThreatConnect Technical Blogs and Reports source here.”

The APT-C-23 group used the same malware in the campaigns analyzed by ThreatConnect and Palo Alto Networks and ClearSky, anyway the command and control (C&C) servers were different.

ThreatConnect observed that malware used in the recent campaign was hosted on the IP address 195.154.110[.]237 that stored four domains, two of which (upfile2box[.]com and 7aga[.]net) registered by a freelance web developer from Gaza.

The researchers believe that the threat actors and at least one of the target is located in the Palestinian Territories. It is likely, the cyber espionage campaign may have been aimed at Hamas, Israel or the Fatah party.

“Just like we can’t make a definitive determination as to who conducted this campaign, we do not know for sure who it was intended to target. What we do know is that several of the malicious files were submitted to a public malware analysis site from the Palestinian Territories. This tells us that it is possible either the threat actors or at least one of the targets is located in that area,” concluded ThreatConnect.


Turla APT malware now retrieves C&C address from Instagram comments
8.6.2017 securityaffairs
APT

A malicious code used by Turla APT in a recent campaign leverages comments posted to Instagram to obtain the address of the command and control servers.
Malware researchers at security firm ESET have spotted a new piece of malware used by Turla APT in cyber attacks. The malicious code leverages comments posted to Instagram to obtain the address of its command and control (C&C) servers.

Turla APT is considered a group of hackers linked to the Russian Government, it is also known as Waterbug, KRYPTON and Venomous Bear.

The APT have been active since at least 2007, it was involved in several high-profile attacks against targets worldwide, including the ones aimed at Swiss defense firm RUAG and the U.S. Central Command.

Last time experts analyzed the threat actor was March 2017 when ESET firm reported that it was continuing to improve its Carbon backdoor, the malware researchers detected new versions released on a regular basis. The group is still active and it is developing new hacking tools and empowering the existing ones.

At the annual Kaspersky Lab conference, researcher Thomas Rid along security experts Costin Raiu and Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade presented the findings of its research that definitively connect the Moonlight Maze cyber espionage campaigns to the Russian APT group.

Turla APT recently targeted the websites of ministries, embassies and other organizations worldwide, in its last campaign hackers leverage social media to control their malware.

The APT has powered watering hole attacks compromising websites that are likely to be visited by targets of interest, the cyber spies injected malicious code on the websites in an effort to redirect their visitors to a server that delivered a JavaScript tool designed for track a profile of the victim’s machine.

In one case, hackers used a Firefox extension that worked as a backdoor, something similar was spotted by malware researchers at Bitdefender while analyzing the Pacifier Operation.

“Through our monitoring of these watering hole campaigns, we happened upon a very interesting sample. Some of you may remember the Pacifier APT report by BitDefender describing a spearphishing campaign with a malicious Microsoft Word document sent to several institutions worldwide. These malicious documents would then drop a backdoor. We now know that this report describes Skipper, a first stage backdoor used by the Turla gang.” reads the analysis published by ESET. “That report also contains a description of a Firefox extension dropped by the same type of malicious document. It turns out we have found what most likely is an update of this Firefox extension. It is a JavaScript backdoor, different in terms of implementation to the one described in the Pacifier APT report, but with similar functionalities.”

The Firefox extension used in this last campaign was spread through the website of a Swiss security company’s website. The backdoor gathers information on the infected system, and it allows attackers to perform ordinary spyware actions.

The peculiarity of the backdoor is the way it obtains the address of its C&C server, it looks at a specific comment posted to a photo on Britney Spears’ Instagram account.

The comment reads

“#2hot make loved to her, uupss #Hot #X,”

Turla APT instagram

Parsing the comment with a regular expression it is possible to obtain a bit.ly URL that represents the backdoor’s C&C server.

The extension determines the comment to parse by computing a custom hash value that must match 183.

“The extension will look at each photo’s comment and will compute a custom hash value. If the hash matches 183, it will then run this regular expression on the comment in order to obtain the path of the bit.ly URL:

(?:\\u200d(?:#|@)(\\w)” continues the analysis.

Parsing the comment through the regex experts got the following bit.ly URL:

http://bit[.]ly/2kdhuHX

“Looking a bit more closely at the regular expression, we see it is looking for either @|# or the Unicode character \200d. This character is actually a non-printable character called ‘Zero Width Joiner’, normally used to separate emojis. Pasting the actual comment or looking at its source, you can see that this character precedes each character that makes the path of the bit.ly URL:

smith2155<200d>#2hot ma<200d>ke lovei<200d>d to <200d>her, <200d>uupss <200d>#Hot <200d>#X

When resolving this shortened link, it leads to static[.]travelclothes.org/dolR_1ert.php , which was used in the past as a watering hole C&C by the Turla crew.” states ESET.

Experts noticed that this above bit.ly URL was only accessed 17 times, which could indicate that hackers were testing the technique.

Researchers also highlighted that some of the APIs used by the malicious extension will no longer work in future Firefox releases, for this reason, upcoming versions of the backdoor will have to be implemented differently.


Russia-linked hacker group APT28 continues to target Montenegro
7.6.2017 securityaffairs
APT

Once again, Montenegro was targeted by the Russia-linked hacker group APT28, according to the experts it is just the beginning.
On June 5 Montenegro officially joined NATO alliance despite the strong opposition from Russian Government that threatened to retaliate.

Cybersecurity experts believe that a new wave of attacks from the cyberspace will hit the state. In February, for the second time in a few months, Montenegro suffered massive and prolonged cyberattacks against government and media websites.

Researchers at security firm FireEye who analyzed the attacks observed malware and exploits associated with the notorious Russia-linked APT group known as APT28 (aka Fancy Bear, Pawn Storm, Strontium, Sofacy, Sednit, and Tsar Team).

Another massive attack hit the country’s institutions during October elections, amid speculation that the Russian Government was involved.

In the last string of attacks, hackers targeted Montenegro with spear phishing attacks, the malicious messages used weaponized documents pertaining to a NATO secretary meeting and a visit by a European army unit to Montenegro.

The hackers delivered the GAMEFISH backdoor (aka Sednit, Seduploader, JHUHUGIT and Sofacy), a malware that was used only by the APT28 group in past attacks.


According to FireEye, the documents delivered the backdoor via a Flash exploit framework dubbed DealersChoice.

“NATO expansion is often viewed as a security threat by the Russian Federation, and Montenegro’s bid for membership was strongly contested by Russia and the pro-Russia political parties in Montenegro,” Tony Cole, vice president and chief technology officer for global government at FireEye, told journalists today.” reportedEl Reg.

“It’s likely that this activity is a part of APT28’s continued focus on targeting various NATO member states, as well as the organization itself. Russia has strongly opposed Montenegro’s NATO accession process and is likely to continue using cyber capabilities to undermine Montenegro’s smooth integration into the alliance,”

The bait documents first gather information of the target system in an effort to determine which version of Flash Player it is running on the machine, then it connects the C&C server to receive the appropriate Flash exploit. The exploits used in the attacks include the code to trigger the CVE-2015-7645 and CVE-2016-7855, are used to deliver GAMEFISH.

At the time I’m writing there is no news about the specific targets of the campaign neither is the attacks were successful.

Clearly, APT28’s and other Russian linked APT will continue to target the country such as other NATO member states.


President Putin blames Patriotic Russian hackers for recent Election attacks
2.6.2017 securityaffairs 
APT

Russian President Putin says patriotic hackers may have powered attacks against foreign countries and denied Russia involvement.
President Vladimir Putin says patriotic hackers may have launched cyber attacks against foreign countries and but denied Russia involvement in cyber espionage campaigns.

President Putin
Source NY Times

Russian state-sponsored APT groups area accused of continuous interferences with 2016 US Presidential Election elections in the United States, and experts also speculate the involvement of the same hackers in French elections.

Putin told journalists on Thursday at the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg that it is impossible to predict the operations of Russian hackers against the upcoming elections in Germany because hackers are unpredictable like artists.

“If artists get up in the morning feeling good, all they do all day is paint,” Putin said. “The same goes for hackers. They got up today and read that something is going on internationally. If they are feeling patriotic they will start contributing, as they believe, to the justified fight against those speaking ill of Russia.”

President Putin excludes his country engagement in cyber espionage against foreign governments, he also highlighted that hackers could use false flags to make hard the attribution of a cyber attack.

Putin also excludes that cyber attacks against politicians and parties can have a real impact on elections.

“We do not engage in this activity at the government level and are not going to engage in it. On the contrary, we try to prevent this from happening in our country,” he said. “At any rate, I believe that no hackers can affect the election campaign in any European country, nor in Asia or in America.”

To highlight the complexity of attributing a cyber attacks let me add that while President Putin made the declaration on the patriotic hackers, the head of the French government’s cyber security agency, which investigated leaks from President Emmanuel Macron‘s election campaign, said the French intelligence has found no trace of a Russian hacking groups behind the cyber attack.

“In an interview in his office Thursday with The Associated Press, Guillaume Poupard said the Macron campaign hack “was so generic and simple that it could have been practically anyone.” reported the Time.

Back to the declarations of President Putin, Thomas Rid, a professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, speculate they are part of the Russian strategic.

1 Jun
Thomas Rid ✔ @RidT
Putin seems to begin the process of admitting Kremlin behind 2016 active measure.

Step 1: admit RU, but not gov yet https://nyti.ms/2srC9Mg
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Thomas Rid ✔ @RidT
Putin is a professional. He knows his intel history. He likely knows that sooner or later operators will talk, write memoirs; may take years
5:55 PM - 1 Jun 2017 · Virginia, USA
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Almost any security firm has linked the APT 28, APT29 and Turla campaigns to Russian Government, the declaration of President Putin do not convince us, but without solid evidence we cannot contradict them.


A new report links North Korea to the Lazarus APT Group
31.5.2017 securityaffairs
APT

Moscow-based threat intelligence firm Group-IB published a report that details evidence linking the Lazarus APT Group to North Korea.
Researchers at security firm Group-IB released a report that links the notorious Lazarus APT to North Korea.

The activity of the Lazarus Group surged in 2014 and 2015, its members used mostly custom-tailored malware in their attacks and experts that investigated on the crew consider it highly sophisticated.

This threat actor has been active since at least 2009, possibly as early as 2007, and it was involved in both cyber espionage campaigns and sabotage activities aimed to destroy data and disrupt systems. Security researchers discovered that North Korean Lazarus APT group was behind recent attacks on banks, including the Bangladesh cyber heist.

According to security experts, the group was behind, other large-scale cyber espionage campaigns against targets worldwide, including the Troy Operation, the DarkSeoul Operation, and the Sony Picture hack.

According to the experts from Group-IB, the attacks against the SWIFT systems used by banks worldwide left the most clues.

The Lazarus APT group conducted massive reconnaissance operations before the banks attack in order to gather information on the infrastructure of the targets.

“We have detected and thoroughly analyzed the C&C infrastructure used by Lazarus,” explained Dmitry Volkov, Head of Threat Intelligence Department. “Our research shows how hackers gained access to the banks’ information systems, what malware they used, and who their attempts were aimed at.”

Investigating the Group-IB activity the researchers analyzed the complex botnet infrastructure used by the hackers.
To make harder the investigation of the attribution of the attacks, the cyberspies used a three-layer architecture of compromised servers that communicate through SSL encrypted channels.

“In addition to encrypted traffic, data sent through SSL channel was additionally encrypted. The attackers achieved anonymity by employing a legitimate VPN client – SoftEther VPN. In some cases, they also used corporate web servers that were part of the attacked infrastructure.” states the report published by Group-IB.

Lazarus APT 3-Layer Architecture

According to the researchers, the APT group changed its TTPs after the publication of the Operation Blockbuster report that revealed much information about the activity of the crew.

“According to our investigation of the Lazarus infrastructure, the threat actors connected to the end C&C layer (Layer3) from two North Korean IP addresses 210.52.109.22 and 175.45.178.222. The second IP-address relates to Potonggang District, perhaps coincidentally, where National Defence Commission is
located — the highest military body in North Korea” continues the report.

Investigating the Lazarus attack, Group-IB discovered the hackers used two IP addresses belonging to the C&C server infrastructure.

The first is 210.52.109.22 is assigned to a company in China named China Netcom, but according to Group-IB’s sources the range of IPs 210.52.109.0/24 was assigned to North Korea

The second IP address, 175.45.178.222, points to North Korean Internet service provider because it is allocated to the Potonggang District. This is the same District where the military National Defence Commission is located.

“210.52.109.22 belongs to an autonomous system China Netcom. However, some sources indicate that the set of IPs 210.52.109.0/24 is assigned to North Korea. 175.45.178.222 refers to a North Korean Internet service provider. The Whois service indicates that this address is allocated to the Potonggang District, perhaps coincidentally, where Natinal Defence Commission is located — the highest military body in North Korea”

The researchers also discovered that the Lazarus APT Group is masquerading its operations as Russian hackers. The group used false flags in its malware to deceive the investigators and to attribute the attack to the Russian hackers.

Group-IB experts, like peers from security firm BAE, discovered Russian words in the source code of the malware, but they noticed an incorrect use of the words.

Hackers also leveraged Flash and Silverlight exploits used by Russian state-sponsored hackers, they also used the Enigma Protector, an anti-tampering system for executable files developed by a Russian company.

“They added specific debugging symbols and strings containing Russian words to a new version of Client_TrafficForwarder, a
module designed to proxy network traffic.” continues the report. “To protect their executables, they used Enigma Protector, a commercial product, which was created by a Russian software developer. They also used exploits for Flash and SilverLight from sets of exploits created by Russian-speaking hackers. These masquerade techniques did initially mislead some researchers who conducted express analysis of malicious code.”

I don’t want to tell you more, for more details on the Group-IB investigation give a look at the interesting report that also includes IOCs about the malware used in recent operations attributed to the Lazarus Group.


Researchers found a link between the APT3 Threat Group and the Chinese Intelligence Agency
21.5.2017 securityaffairs 
APT

Security experts at threat intelligence firm Record Future have found a clear link between APT3 cyber threat group and China’s Ministry of State Security.
The curtain has been pulled back a little on the Chinese Intelligence Agency intelligence gathering structure — and it includes private security contractors and the network vendor supply chain.

In 2010, security vendor FireEye identified the Pirpi Remote Access Trojan (RAT) which exploited a then 0-day vulnerability in Internet Explorer versions 6, 7 and 8. FireEye named the threat group APT3 which has also been described as TG-0100, Buckeye, Gothic Panda, and UPS and described them as “one of the most sophisticated threat groups” being tracked at the time.

Since then, APT3 has been actively penetrating corporations and governments in the US, UK and most recently Hong Kong — and everyone has been trying to figure out who they are. APT3 functions very differently than 3LA, the former Chinese military hacking organization leading to the assumption that APT3 is not part of the military complex. At least not officially.

On May 9th, 2017, an unknown party using the alias ‘intrusiontruth’ published a series of blogs posts describing connections between the Pirpi RAT command and control components and shareholders of the Chinese security contractor Guangzhou Boyu Information Technology Company, aka Boyusec.

“On May 9, a mysterious group calling itself “intrusiontruth” identified a contractor for the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) as the group behind the APT3 cyber intrusions.” states the analysis published by Recorder Future.

The names of two specific shareholders of Boyusec appear in the domain registration for the Pirpi C&C servers. This is particularly interesting because Boyusec supports the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) by collecting civilian human intelligence. Think of them as an outsourcer for a government agency like the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA).

Also interesting is that in 2016 a Pentagon report described the relationship between Boyusec and network equipment manufacturer, Huawei. According to the report, the two companies were colluding to develop security equipment with embedded backdoors which would likely be used by Boyusec to compromise Huawei customers.

“In November 2016, the Washington Free Beacon reported that a Pentagon internal intelligence report had exposed a product that Boyusec and Huawei were jointly producing.” continues the analysis.”According to the Pentagon’s report, the two companies were working together to produce security products, likely containing a backdoor, that would allow Chinese intelligence “to capture data and control computer and telecommunications equipment.” The article quotes government officials and analysts stating that Boyusec and the MSS are “closely connected,” and that Boyusec appears to be a cover company for the MSS.”

To protect our networks, it is important to assess the threats. An important part of threat assessment is to anticipate the motivation of the attackers. APT3 has demonstrated above average skills and has been active for a long time. Add ties to the network vendor supply chain and you have the makings of a dangerous adversary. As part of the Chinese MSS structure you can start to guess at motivation. With this new information, it is a good time to reassess your threat model.

APT3 China

“The implications are clear and expansive. Recorded Future’s research leads us to attribute APT3 to the Chinese Ministry of State Security and Boyusec with a high degree of confidence. Boyusec has a Boyusec has a documented history of producing malicious technology and working with the Chinese intelligence services.” concludes the analysis.


APT3 Hackers Linked to Chinese Ministry of State Security

18.5.2017 securityweek APT
Independent researchers and experts from threat intelligence firm Recorded Future are confident that the cyber espionage group tracked as APT3 is directly linked to the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS).

While much of the security community typically tries to avoid making attribution statements, arguing that false flags make this task difficult, there are some individuals and companies that don’t shy away from accusing governments of conducting sophisticated cyberattacks.

A mysterious group called “intrusiontruth,” which claims to focus on investigating some of the most important advanced persistent threat (APT) actors, has recently published a series of blog posts on APT3, a group that is also known as UPS Team, Gothic Panda, Buckeye and TG-0110.

The cyberspies, believed to be sponsored by China, have been active since at least 2009, targeting many organizations in the United States and elsewhere via spear-phishing, zero-day exploits, and various other tools and techniques. Researchers noticed last year that APT3 had shifted its attention from the U.S. and the U.K. to Hong Kong, where it had mainly targeted political entities using a backdoor dubbed “Pirpi.”

Intrusiontruth has conducted an analysis of APT3’s command and control (C&C) infrastructure, particularly domain registration data. Their research led to two individuals, named Wu Yingzhuo and Dong Hao, who apparently registered many of the domains used by the threat actor.

Both these individuals are listed as shareholders for a China-based security firm called the Guangzhou Boyu Information Technology Company, or Boyusec. In November 2016, the Washington Free Beacon learned from Pentagon intelligence officials that this company had been working with Chinese telecoms giant Huawei to develop spyware-laden security products that would be loaded onto computers and phones. The unnamed officials said Boyusec was “closely connected” to the Chinese Ministry of State Security.

Intrusiontruth concluded that either Boyusec has two shareholders with the same name as members of APT3, or Boyusec is in fact APT3, which is the more likely scenario.

Recorded Future has dug deeper to find more evidence connecting APT3 to China’s MSS. In a report published on Wednesday, the company said it had attributed the group directly to the MSS with “a high degree of confidence.”

Researchers pointed out that in addition to Huawei, which claimed to use Boyusec for security evaluations of its corporate intranet, Boyusec was also a partner of the Guangdong Information Technology Security Evaluation Center (Guangdong ITSEC), and the organizations have been collaborating on an active defense lab since 2014.

Guangdong ITSEC is apparently a subordinate of the China Information Technology Evaluation Center (CNITSEC), which, according to academic research, is run by the Ministry of State Security.

Experts believe many of the ministry’s subordinates, particularly ones at provincial and local levels, have legitimate public missions and act as a cover-up for intelligence operations.

“Companies in sectors that have been victimized by APT3 now must adjust their strategies to defend against the resources and technology of the Chinese government. In this real-life David vs. Goliath situation, customers need both smart security controls and policy, as well as actionable and strategic threat intelligence,” Recorded Future said in its report.


APT32, a new APT group alleged linked to the Vietnamese Government is targeting foreign corporations
16.5.2017 securityaffairs
APT

APT32 is a new APT group discovered by security experts at FireEye that is targeting Vietnamese interests around the globe.
The APT32 group, also known as OceanLotus Group, has been active since at least 2013, according to the experts it is a state-sponsored hacking group.

The hackers targeting organizations across multiple industries and have also targeted foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists.

Since at least 2014, experts at FireEye have observed APT32 targeting foreign corporations with an interest in Vietnam’s manufacturing, consumer products, and hospitality sectors. The APT32 is also targeting peripheral network security and technology infrastructure corporations, and security firms that may have connections with foreign investors.

“APT32 leverages a unique suite of fully-featured malware, in conjunction with commercially-available tools, to conduct targeted operations that are aligned with Vietnamese state interests.” states the analysis published by FireEye.

FireEye highlighted that currently, it is impossible to precisely link the group to the Vietnamese government even if the information gathered by the hackers would be of very little use to any other state.

According to the experts, the cyber attacks seemed to be assessing the victims’ adherence to Vietnamese regulations but the Vietnamese government denies its involvement.

“The government of Vietnam does not allow any form of cyber-attacks against organizations or individuals,” said foreign ministry spokeswoman Le Thi Thu Hang. “All cyber-attacks or threats to cybersecurity, must be condemned and severely punished in accordance with regulations and laws.”

Back to the last wave of attacks, the APT32 hackers use phishing emails containing a weaponized attachment. It is interesting to note that the attachment is not a Word document, instead, it is an ActiveMime file containing an OLE file containing malicious macros.

Another element of innovation for this campaign is that attacker tracked the success of the phishing emails, using legitimate cloud-based email analytics. The phishing attachments contain an HTML image tags.

“When a document with this feature is opened, Microsoft Word will attempt to download the external image, even if macros were disabled. In all phishing lures analyzed, the external images did not exist.” reads the analysis. “Mandiant consultants suspect that APT32 was monitoring web logs to track the public IP address used to request remote images. When combined with email tracking software, APT32 was able to closely track phishing delivery, success rate, and conduct further analysis about victim organizations while monitoring the interest of security firms.”

The embedded macros create two scheduled tasks to gain persistence for the backdoors used by the hackers.

The first task executes the Squiblydoo application to enable the download of a backdoor from APT32 infrastructure. The second leads to a secondary backdoor delivered as a multi-stage PowerShell script configured to communicate with the domains blog.panggin[.]org, share.codehao[.]net, and yii.yiihao126[.]net.

APT32

APT32 threat actors regularly cleared select event log entries in order to conceal their operations, they also heavily obfuscated their PowerShell-based tools and shellcode loaders with Daniel Bohannon’s Invoke-Obfuscation framework.

The arsenal of APT32 includes a custom suite of backdoors such as Windshield, Komprogo, Soundbite, Phoreal, and Beacon.

FireEye warns of the increasing number of nation-state actors using cyber operations to gather intelligence.

“FireEye assesses that APT32 is a cyber espionage group aligned with Vietnamese government interests,” Concluded FireEye. “As more countries utilize inexpensive and efficient cyber operations, there is a need for public awareness of these threats and renewed dialogue around emerging nation-state intrusions that go beyond public sector and intelligence targets.”